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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Government of India has faced fierce public pressure to 
combat corruption since the explosion of various high-profile 
corruption scandals during 2010.  Activists and some national 
legislatures are pushing for legislation that they hope will improve 
enforcement and impose penalties on public officials and 
individuals convicted of corruption offenses.  In response to a 
massive public campaign against corruption erupting during 2010, 
the Indian Parliament introduced draft anticorruption legislation 
that would establish an independent ombudsman to enforce 
anticorruption statutes. 
While supporters claim that the proposed legislation will 
increase the effectiveness of investigations and prosecutions of 
public officials involved in corruption scandals, the legislation will 
likely be inadequate in effectively fighting corruption.  Proposed 
legislation does not modify the existing substantive law pertaining 
to the supply of bribes, which emphasizes penalties for public 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss4/11
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officers who accept or demand bribes and provides that a bribe-
giver is punishable only for abetting a bribe-taker’s acceptance of a 
bribe.2  Additionally, the proposed legislation does not modify the 
enforcement procedures available in India’s current anticorruption 
regime but maintains a status quo in emphasizing criminal 
prosecution rather than introducing enforcement mechanisms that 
encourage private sector participation, such as settlement 
procedures and ongoing monitoring.  As a result, the proposed 
legislation is likely to be ineffective in combatting corruption in 
India on a wide scale. 
Recent anticorruption efforts in India are taking place at a time 
of increasing global attention to combatting corruption.  During 
2011, Russia passed legislation criminalizing foreign bribery and 
imposing monetary sanctions on companies and individuals who 
bribe foreign public officials, and during 2012, the country ratified 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) Anti-Bribery Convention.3  In May 2011, China 
criminalized bribery of foreign government officials and officials of 
public international organizations.4  During 2010, the United 
Kingdom passed its first modern anticorruption statute, the U.K. 
Bribery Act.5  In August 2013, Brazil passed a civil enforcement law 
that compliments existing criminal anticorruption laws by 
imposing strict liability on foreign and domestic corporations that 
bribe public officials and prohibiting bid-rigging in connection 
with public procurement projects.6  In recent years, the United 
States has significantly increased its enforcement of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Acts (FCPA), a statute penalizing the bribery of 
foreign government officials, and pursued increasingly serious 
 
2 A “bribe-giver” or briber is an individual or entity “who offers a bribe.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 217 (9th ed. 2009).  A “bribe-taker” or bribee is an 
individual or entity who “receives a bribe.”  Id. 
3 See OECD Welcomes Russia Introducing Law to Make Foreign Bribery a Crime, 
OECD (May 5, 2011), http://www.oecd.org/document/36/0,3746,en_21571361_ 
44315115_47769508_1_1_1_1,00.html (announcing Russia’s new anti-bribery 
legislation). 
4 See Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by 
National People’s Congress, Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997) art. 385 
(establishing criminal liability for taking official bribes); id. at art. 389 
(criminalizing the offering of bribes to officials); id. at art. 164 (providing criminal 
penalties for giving property to a foreign public official or an official of an 
international public organization for the purposes of “seeking illegitimate 
benefit”). 
5 See generally, Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23 (Eng.) [hereinafter, Bribery Act]. 
6 See generally, Lei No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013 (Braz.), available at 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2011-2014/2013/Lei/L12846.htm. 
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penalties for violations.7  Notably, these five statutes, unlike the 
proposed legislation in India, penalize the supply of corruption as 
a principal criminal offense. 
Non-governmental organizations have also advocated 
targeting the supply of corruption.  Transparency International 
points out that corruption involves both a giver and a taker, and 
therefore “advocates strong measures to curb bribery’s supply 
side, including the criminalisation of . . . bribery . . . as well as its 
demand side, including disclosure of assets for public officials and 
adoption of codes of conduct.”8 
To support the proposition that anticorruption efforts in India 
should focus on the supply as well as the demand side of 
corruption and embrace a balance of cooperative as well as 
criminal enforcement measures, this Comment will undertake a 
comparison of the Bribery Act and the FCPA.  This Comment will 
consider what India may borrow from these supply-oriented 
statutes and their enforcement, while focusing on bribery as a 
 
7 See The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 95-213, Title I, 
Dec. 19, 1977, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as scattered provisions of 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a 
note, 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff) [hereinafter FCPA]; Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant 
Att’y Gen., Criminal Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address at the 26th National 
Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Washington, D.C., Nov. 8, 2011, 
[hereinafter Breuer speech], http:// www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/ 
2011/crm-speech-111108.html (noting increasing penalties in FCPA criminal 
trials); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Secures More 
than $2 Billion in Judgments and Settlements as a Result of Enforcement Actions 
Led by the Criminal Division (Jan. 21, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/ pr/2011/January/11-crm-085.html (remarking 
that FCPA enforcement led to $1 billion in penalties during FY 2010, the largest 
amount in the FCPA’s history); Joseph Palazzolo & Samuel Rubenfeld, U.S. Probes 
Oracle Dealings, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405311190335270457654084 
1634820096.html#ixzz1b3lQ2qmQ (“Penalties have increased geometrically, with 
criminal fines in fiscal 2009 and 2010 combined totaling nearly $2 billion, up from 
about $11 million in 2004.”).  During 2010, the government entered into five of the 
ten largest settlements in FCPA history.  See also A Tale of Two Laws, America’s 
Anti-Corruption Law Deters Foreign Investment.  Britain’s Is Smarter, ECONOMIST, 
Sept. 17, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/21529103 [hereinafter A Tale of 
Two Laws] (describing a $400M fine against BAE Systems, a British defense 
contractor, and a $365M fine against ENI, an Italian oil firm).  During 2010, a U.S. 
court imposed the longest FCPA prison sentence in the act’s history—eighty-
seven months, including sixty months for conspiracy to violate the FCPA and 
twenty-seven months for making false statements to federal agents.  See generally 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Virginia Resident Sentenced to 87 Months in 
Prison for Bribing Foreign Government Officials (Apr. 19, 2010), 
http://www.justice. gov/opa/pr/2010/April/10-crm-442.html.   
8 Corruption Perceptions Index 2006, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, Nov. 5, 2006, http:// 
archive.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2006/cpi_2006. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss4/11
SOLOMON_REVISED (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2014  1:23 PM 
2013] CORRUPTION IN INDIA 905 
subset of corruption.9  In making these recommendations, this 
Comment will emphasize similarities between the FCPA and the 
Bribery Act, as well as a number of differences.  For example, the 
FCPA exempts facilitation payments and certain bona fide 
corporate expenditures while the Bribery Act contains neither 
defense.  U.S. law imposes strict vicarious liability on a company 
for violations by its employees, but it also provides guidance that 
company programs designed to prevent violations should result in 
sentence reductions.  On the other hand, the Bribery Act penalizes 
a company that fails to prevent employees from bribing on its 
behalf, yet it allows a complete defense if the company had 
adequate procedures to prevent such violations.  This article will 
explore these and other differences in the context of Indian 
anticorruption efforts. 
This Comment will also emphasize that, to develop a successful 
anticorruption regime, India should embrace strict enforcement 
mechanisms, including criminal prosecution and fines, as well as 
business-friendly policies, such as cooperative agreements with 
businesses and recognition of reasonable defenses.  Moreover, this 
Comment will emphasize how a balance between these objectives 
has been central to successful FCPA enforcement.10 
Section 1 of this Comment describes the various public and 
private costs of corruption and its impact on India.  Section 2 
relates past and current anticorruption efforts in India and the 
limitations of these efforts’ demand-oriented approach.  Section 3 
discusses principal offenses under the FCPA and the Bribery Act 
and recommends what principle anti-bribery offenses and 
corresponding defenses India should adopt in future 
anticorruption efforts.  Section 4 considers the FCPA’s accounting 
requirements and recommends that India adopt similar 
requirements as part of its anticorruption regime.  Section 5 
describes the methods for enforcing the FCPA and the Bribery Act 
and provides recommendations for similar mechanisms to facilitate 
 
9 A bribe is a “price, reward, gift or favor bestowed or promised with a view 
to pervert the judgment of or influence the action of a person in a position of 
trust.”  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).  Corruption is more broadly 
defined as “[d]epravity, perversion, or taint; an impairment of integrity, virtue, or 
moral principle; esp., the impairment of a public official’s duties by bribery.”  Id. 
10 See generally Philip B. Heyman [sic], Justice Outlines Priorities in Prosecuting 
Violations of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, AM. BANKER, Nov. 21, 1979, at 4 
(reproducing an early statement by a DOJ official describing the agency’s 
intention to enforce the statute strictly and to provide businesses with useful 
advice and information). 
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Indian anticorruption efforts while considering the country’s 
potential compliance with the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention11 
and the U.N. Convention Against Corruption.12  Section 6 
considers some of the likely institutional dynamics of future 
anticorruption regimes in India.  Section 7 provides a brief 
summary and concluding remarks. 
1.1.  Political and Social Costs of Corruption 
Corruption poses public costs, political and economic, as well 
as private costs to individuals and businesses.13  A number of 
studies and scholars have clearly demonstrated the political costs 
of corruption.14  According to Philip M. Nichols, corruption 
“degrades bureaucratic decision-making and popular support for 
change.”15  Nichols explains that corruption poses at least three 
types of political risks:  harm to the relationship between electors 
and representatives, economic distortion, and public distrust of the 
government.16  Similarly, Yale University’s Susan Rose-Ackerman 
 
11 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-43, 37 I.L.M. 1, art. 1, 
cl. 1. (1998) [hereinafter OECD Anti-Bribery Convention] (requiring parties to 
establish a criminal offense for any person who, either directly or through 
intermediaries, intentionally offers, promises, or gives any advantage, to a foreign 
official to induce the official to “act or refrain from acting . . . to obtain or retain 
business or other improper advantage in the conduct of international business”).   
12 U.N. Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. 
Doc.A/RES/58/4, annex (Oct. 31, 2003) [hereinafter U.N. Anticorruption 
Convention] (requiring parties to take measures to prevent and criminalize 
corruption). 
13 See Andrew White, The Paradox of Corruption As Antithesis to Economic 
Development: Does Corruption Undermine Economic Development in Indonesia and 
China and Why Are the Experiences Different in Each Country?, 8 ASIAN-PAC. L. & 
POL’Y J. 1, 2 (2006) (finding that while corruption was an impediment to growth in 
Indonesia, it functioned as a useful state tool in China, and ultimately concluding 
that “the extent to which corruption is antithetical to economic development 
ultimately depends upon context”); Johann Graf Lambsdorff, How Corruption 
Affects Productivity, 56 KYKLOS 457, 457–68 (2003) (using empirical evidence  to 
demonstrate corruption’s adverse impact on foreign direct investment and capital 
inflows and link corruption to lower productivity).  Details of a fuller discussion 
on the precise impact of public corruption are beyond the scope of this Comment. 
14 See generally Philip M. Nichols, Corruption as an Assurance Problem, 19 AM. 
U. INT’L L. REV. 1307 (2004); see also Christopher J. Anderson & Yuliya V. 
Tverdova, Corruption, Political Allegiances, and Attitudes Toward Government in 
Contemporary Democracies, 47 AM. J. POL. SCIENCE 91, 93 (2003) (describing the 
negative impact of corruption on views of government). 
15 Nichols, Corruption as an Assurance Problem, supra note 14, at 1307. 
16 See Philip M. Nichols, The Perverse Effect of Campaign Contribution Limits: 
Reducing the Allowable Amounts Increases the Likelihood of Corruption in the Federal 
Legislature, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 77, 86 (2011) (detailing the effects of corruption in the 
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points out that corruption undermines government legitimacy, 
especially of democratic governments, because “[c]itizens may 
come to believe that the government is simply for sale to the 
highest bidder.”17 
Corruption also increases a government’s costs in providing 
public services,18 encourages government officials to misallocate 
spending to industries that offer bribes, and distorts the public role 
of government employees.19  Furthermore, corruption may shift 
growth to the informal sector and decrease tax revenues by 
increasing the costs of creating and maintaining businesses in the 
formal sector.20  Additionally, by reducing efficiency in the 
administration of public goods and services, corruption 
disproportionately harms citizens of lower economic strata who 
most heavily depend on public goods.21  In some cases, corruption 
 
U.S. legislature in the context of campaign finance regulation). But see Jonathan 
Parry, The ‘Crisis of Corruption’ and ‘The Idea of India’: A Worm’s Eye View in 
MORALS OF LEGITIMACY: BETWEEN AGENCY AND SYSTEM (Italo Pardo ed., 2000) 
(arguing that the corruption crisis in India is not a symptom of state weakness but 
rather a sign of the state’s reach and public acceptance of bureaucratic norms). 
17  Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Political Economy of Corruption, in CORRUPTION 
AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 31, 45 (Kimberly Ann Elliott ed., 1997).  The current 
majority party in India’s Parliament, the Congress Party, performed rather poorly 
in the 2012 elections and political analysts contributed this to the party’s failures 
in combatting corruption.  See Rama Lakshmi, India State Election Results Are a 
Blow to Ruling Congress Party, WASH. POST., Mar. 6, 2012, http://articles 
.washingtonpost.com/2012-03-06/world/35449160_1_congress-party-rahul-
gandhi-nehru-gandhi (attributing election results, in part, to nationwide anger 
against government corruption). 
18 See Thomas Fox, FCPA Compliance and FCPA Enforcement: A Look Ahead to 
2009 and Beyond, CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS, May 19, 2009, 
www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/2009/fcpa-compliance-fcpa-
enforcement-obama-mcnulty-ashcroft-comments-on-foreign-corrupt-practices-
act/ (“It is painfully obvious that corruption stifles development—it siphons off 
scarce resources that could improve infrastructure, bolster education systems, and 
strengthen public health”) (quoting then-Senator Barack Obama’s 2006 speech at 
the University of Nairobi). 
19 See Selçuk Akçay, Corruption and Human Development, 26 CATO J. 29, 30 
(2006) (noting that corruption “hinders economic growth and distorts the 
allocation of resources”). 
20 See Nabamita Dutta et al., Informal Sector and Corruption: An Empirical 
Investigation for India 3–4 (Inst. for the Study of Labor Discussion Paper No. 5579, 
2011), http://ftp.iza.org/dp5579.pdf (describing how the relatively inexpensive 
informal business sector offers opportunities to avoid taxes and evade 
regulations). 
21 See generally, DEEPA NARAYAN ET AL., VOICES OF THE POOR: CAN ANYONE 
HEAR US? (2000) (relating the effects of corrupt governments on the poor); Leonid 
Peisakhin, Transparency and Corruption: Evidence from India, 55 J.L. & ECON. 129, 130 
(2012) (“[I]n highly stratified and corrupt societies, the least well-off, that is, those 
who are most in need of government assistance, are often completely powerless 
against government officials”); Press Release, Transparency Int’l U.K., Leading 
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may present an absolute obstacle to individuals from obtaining 
essentials, such as education and utilities.22 
1.2.  Economic Costs of Corruption 
Corruption is generally disruptive to economic growth—one 
U.S. government official explains, “[C]orruption and economic 
prosperity are incompatible . . . .”23  Corruption can deter domestic 
and foreign investment24 by undermining the legitimacy of 
markets25 and disturbing capital flows.26  One International 
 
NGOs Warn Against Withholding Aid From High-risk Countries (Oct. 20, 2011), 
http://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/20111020_high-risk_countries 
(“The poorest of the poor already suffer disproportionally from the bribery and 
corruption which is often entrenched in the high-risk countries . . . .”); Pratap 
Bhanu Mehta, How India Stumbled: Can New Delhi Get Its Groove Back?, 91 FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS 64, 68 (Jul/Aug 2012) (“[S]pending on the social sector, including health 
care and education, has risen from 13.4 percent of the total budget in 2007 to 18.5 
percent today[,] [b]ut due to inefficiencies and corruption, much of that money 
never reaches the targeted beneficiaries.”). 
22 One study on corruption in rural India found that government hospitals 
and electrical services were among the most corrupt among basic public services.  
See Transparency Int’l India & Centre for Media Studies, India Corruption Study 
2005 Summary Report 7–8 (June 2005), http://www.transparency.org/content/ 
download/637/3856.  Corruption in these industries may be particularly 
pernicious to individuals who are first seeking electrical connection or healthcare 
services for which they cannot afford to pay privately.  See also Media Release, 
CIET International, Corruption: The Invisible Price-tag On Education, (Oct. 12, 
1999), http://www.ciet.org/_documents/200622318486.doc (describing how 
corruption prevents students from attending primary school). 
23 See John D. Negroponte, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations, Statement in the U.N. General Assembly (Oct. 31, 2003), http://2001-
2009.state.gov/p/io/rls/rm/2003/25858.htm (arguing in support of the adoption 
of the U.N. Convention Against Corruption). 
24 See Quan V. Le & Meenakshi Rishi, Corruption and Capital Flight: An 
Empirical Assessment, 20 INT’L ECON.J. 523, 534 (Dec. 2006) (concluding that 
corruption significantly increases capital flight); Paulo Mauro, Corruption and 
Growth, 110 Q. J. ECON. 681, 683 (Aug. 1995) (“[C]orruption lowers private 
investment, thereby reducing economic growth, even in subsamples of countries 
in which bureaucratic regulations are very cumbersome.”); Paolo Mauro, The 
Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment, & Government Expenditure (Int’l 
Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 96/98, Sept. 1996), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=882994 (presenting results on the effects of corruption 
on growth and investment); Vito Tanzi & Hamid R. Davoodi, Corruption, Public 
Investment, and Growth, (Int’l Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 97/139, Oct. 
1997), http://ssrn.com/abstract=882701 (determining that corruption reduces 
productivity).  See also Alberto Ades & Rafael Di Tella, The New Economics of 
Corruption: A Survey and Some New Results, 45 POL. STUDIES 496, 499–501 (1997) 
(evaluating Mauro’s research on how corruption adversely affects investment 
regardless of “red tape”). 
25 See M. Habib & L. Zurawicki, Country-Level Investments and the Effect of 
Corruption: Some Empirical Evidence, 10 INT’L BUS.R. 687 (2001) (providing empirical 
evidence that investors are less likely to invest in a foreign market they perceive 
as corrupt); The World Bank, Corruption and Development, PREMNotes No. 4, 1–2 
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Monetary Fund (IMF) official once demonstrated a “negative 
association between corruption and investment, as well as growth, 
[which] is significant in both a statistical and an economic sense.”27  
Corruption also creates a number of tangible costs to 
businesses including higher transaction and compliance costs,28 
capital flow disruptions resulting in reduced (legitimate) market 
liquidity,29 and the creation of legal uncertainty, particularly in the 
enforcement of contracts.30  Bribing public officials, either directly 
or through agents, may also expose companies to criminal liability 
under the FCPA, the Bribery Act, and a growing number of 
applicable foreign statutes.  Moreover, corruption distorts private 
competition by encouraging companies to bribe government 
officials because their competitors may be doing so.31  Smaller 
businesses may be particularly affected by these market distortions 
because they often lack power to yield influence in business 
transactions.32  Additionally, potential reputational costs for 
involvement in corruption are also notable given that “in today’s 
globalised environment, reputation is an increasingly important 
asset that only the foolish and most reckless managers won’t 
 
(May 1998) (“[B]ribers can also purchase monopoly rights to markets—as, for 
example, in the energy sectors in some transition economies, where 
unprecedented amounts of grease payments buttress gigantic monopolistic 
structures.”). 
26 See Johann Graf Lambsdorff, How Corruption Affects Persistent Capital Flows, 
4 ECON. GOV. 229, 229–30 (2003) (commenting on corruption’s impact on capital 
flows). 
27 Mauro, Corruption and Growth, supra note 24, at 705 (“[T]here is evidence 
that bureaucratic efficiency actually causes high investment and growth.”) 
28 See Nichols, Corruption as an Assurance Problem, supra note 14, at 1321–26 
(describing transactional and compliance costs); Siri Schubert & T. Christian 
Miller, At Siemens, Bribery Was Just a Line Item, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/21/business/worldbusiness/21siemens.htm
l?pagewanted=all (reporting one Siemens official’s oversight of an annual bribery 
budget of about $40–50M USD). 
29 See generally Lambsdorff, How Corruption Affects Persistent Capital Flows, 
supra note 26, at 229–30. 
30 See Nichols, Corruption as an Assurance Problem, supra note 14, at 1321–26. 
31 See Philip M. Nichols, Multiple Communities and Controlling Corruption, 88 J. 
BUS. ETHICS, 805, 805–06 (2009) (pointing out the “paradox” of corruption in that 
companies are encouraged to bribe because they do not know whether 
competitors are engaging in bribery even though companies could all reduce costs 
by not bribing).  
32 See When a Bribe is Merely Facilitating Business, ECONOMIST (June 11, 2011),  
http://www.economist.com/blogs/blighty/2011/06/anti-bribery-laws (“[S]mall 
companies may be even more vulnerable to corruption since they often do not 
have the connections to bypass individual officials.”) 
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protect.”33  Given these costs, one news article noted that it “is 
difficult to think of a significant international organisation not 
looking at corruption.”34  Notably, these costs indicate that 
members of the business community, either domestic or foreign, 
may support government efforts to combat the supply of 
corruption in India. 
1.3.   Corruption in India 
The ways in which the political, economic, and business costs 
of corruption have played out in India indicate the importance of 
effective anticorruption legislation in that country.  In a recent 
decision, the Indian Supreme Court stated, “Corruption devalues 
human rights, chokes development[,] and undermines justice, 
liberty, equality, fraternity which are the core values in our 
preambular vision.”35  Mahatma Gandhi is credited with saying, 
“Corruption and hypocrisy ought not to be inevitable products of 
democracy, as they undoubtedly are today.”36  These statements 
are indicative of India’s long-standing, but often unsuccessful, 
struggle to combat corruption.  Transparency International ranked 
India 94th out of 174 countries in the organization’s 2012 
Corruption Perceptions Index.37  Two Indian economists lament 
that corruption “rules over the country with its stranglehold in 
every aspect of the state and consequently in all aspects of life of 
citizens of the state.”38  These economists estimate that bribery is 
most pervasive in transportation, real estate, welfare program 
administration, mining, licensing, and government procurement.39 
 
33 Eric Gutierrez, Why Business Should Care About Fighting Corruption, Poverty 
Matters Blog, GUARDIAN (July 1, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-
development/poverty-matters/2011/jul/01/bribery-act-business-should-fight-
corruption. 
34 Martin Wolf, Corruption in the Spotlight, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1997, at 23 
(explaining that the IMF and World Bank closely scrutinize corruption). 
35  Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh, (2012), S. Ct., Civ. App. No. 
1193 (2012) (India) (Ganguly, J.), ¶ 11 (recommending that government authorities 
resolve corruption complaints within four months and calling for legislation to 
this effect). 
36 ANIL DUTTA MISHRA, FUNDAMENTALS OF GANDHISM 140 (1995). 
37 See Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http:// 
www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results (last visited Jan. 29, 2013) (providing 
rankings and describing methodology used to create such rankings). 
38 BIBEK DEBROY & LAVEESH BHANDARI, CORRUPTION IN INDIA: THE DNA AND 
THE RNA 7 (2012).  
39 Id. at 4–5. 
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Foreign companies conducting business in India regard 
corruption as a widespread problem for obtaining appropriate 
permits and in bidding for government procurement contracts.40  
According to a KPMG survey of British enterprises and investors 
operating in India, concerns over corruption and weak governance 
have hindered investment in India.41  There are indications that 
U.S. investors view India as a “high risk business” environment 
where corruption “is a major concern.”42  U.S.-based companies 
have complained that restrictions under the FCPA placed them at a 
competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis local businesses, which are not 
subject to the FCPA.43 
Corruption in India has created substantial uncertainty in the 
business environment.  For example, in connection with the 
Dabhol Power Project, at the time the largest foreign investment 
project ever undertaken in India, public opposition resulted in 
cancellation and renegotiation of contracts.  Allegations arose that 
the Indian Ministry of Power awarded a power plant contract to an 
Enron-subsidiary in a non-competitive procurement process 
because the company offered to provide kickbacks to government 
officials.44  Although Enron was not formally charged with 
misconduct, the government cancelled and renegotiated the 
contracts after Enron had already invested hundreds of millions of 
dollars.45  Foreign companies doing business in India made 
 
40 See Ashish S. Prasad & Violeta Balan, Strategies for U.S. Companies to 
Mitigate Legal Risks From Doing Business in India, 1587 PLI/Corp 9, 31 (2007) 
(noting that corruption can create a problem for businesses in India and may 
result from “a government official demanding a special ‘fee’ for approval of 
necessary permits or from a business partner looking for a ‘sweetened’ bid”). 
41 See KPMG, Challenges Faced by British Business in India 3, 2011, available at 
http://www.kpmg.com/IN/en/IssuesAndInsights/ThoughtLeadership/British_
Business_India_2011.pdf. 
42  Toral Patel, Comment, Corrupt Practices in India: No Payoff, 20 LOY. L.A. 
INT’L & COMP. L.J., 389, 403 n. 121 (1998) (quoting statements by a senior 
commercial officer with the U.S. Commercial Service, American Investors Wary of 
India, Says U.S. Diplomat, INDIA  J., Sept. 13, 1996, at C4).  
43  See New York City Bar Assoc. Comm. on Int’l Bus. Transactions, The FCPA 
and its Impact on International Business Transactions: Should Anything Be Done to 
Minimize the Consequences of the U.S.’s Unique Position on Combating Offshore 
Corruption? 19,  Dec. 2011, http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/FCPA 
ImpactonInternationalBusinessTransactions.pdf (concluding that a comparison 
between those companies subject to the FCPA and those that are not would likely 
indicate that compliance costs place U.S. companies “at a significant competitive 
disadvantage”). 
44 See Prasad & Balan, supra note 40, at 14–16 (noting allegations that claimed 
the winning bid was not competitive). 
45 Private plaintiffs brought twenty-six separate suits to stop the project 
although these cases were eventually dismissed.  Public opposition to the project 
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statements suggesting that were renegotiations to fail, and Enron 
left without a contract, there would be repercussions for future 
investment in India.46  
More recently, in early 2012, the Supreme Court of India 
cancelled 122 2G licenses first granted in 2008 on a first-come, first-
serve basis.  The former telecom minister allegedly made a number 
of last minute changes to the rules governing the submission of 
bids and subsequently tipped off only a few firms, thus excluding 
a number of competitive bids that did not comply with the revised 
rules.  The Supreme Court of India determined that the 
government granted the licenses in a “wholly arbitrary and 
unconstitutional” manner, at 2001 prices.47  The cancellation will 
adversely affect businesses that purchased licenses from the 
tipped-off firms even where those firms had no knowledge of any 
impropriety.  Additionally, Moody’s Investors Service, Inc., the 
crediting agency, reported that cancellation of the telecom licenses 
would “add to the problems faced by Indian banks.”48  In a similar 
 
continued following the negotiations although the project was completed in 1999.  
See generally Jeswald W. Salacuse, Renegotiating International Project Agreements, 24 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1319, 1343–57 (2000). 
46 Richard P. Teisch & William A. Stoever, Enron in India—Lessons From a 
Renegotiation, 35 MID-ATLANTIC J. BUS. 51, 59 (1999).  The parties renegotiated the 
contract for terms less favorable to Enron.  See John Elliot, India’s Slide Into Sleaze, 
ASIAN WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 1995.  The U.S. government did not bring charges 
because the government stated it had no reason to suspect that Enron had 
violated the FCPA.  See Patel, supra note 42, at 405 (detailing how the ongoing 
conflicts between the Indian central and state governments contributed to a loss of 
investors’ confidence in Indian investment opportunities).  
47 The verdict canceled licenses held by five companies including joint 
ventures of local and foreign companies.  See Centre for Public Interest Litigation 
et al v. Union of India et al, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 423 of 2010, S.Ct. (India) 
(resolving a private complaint calling for prosecution of the former 
telecommunications minister).  Firms that successfully received licenses are 
alleged to have immediately resold the licenses at substantially higher rates to 
foreign telecom firms.  Reports have indicated the potentially adverse effects on 
business investments in India.  See Vikas Bajaj, Indian Court Cancels Contentious 
Wireless Licenses, N.Y.TIMES, Feb. 2, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/03/business/global/india-supreme-court-
cancels-2g-licenses.html?_r=0 (“The ruling could also wipe out investments in the 
Indian telecommunications industry that are worth billions of dollars.”).  
48  Telecom Licenses Cancellation Not an Issue But Adds to Problems of 
Indian Banks, MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE (Feb. 27, 2012), http://www. 
moodys.com/research/Moodys-Telecom-licenses-cancellation-not-an-issue-but-
adds-to--PR_238869.  In January 2013, a number of businesses implicated by the 
Supreme Court’s decision filed a curative petition, which requires a certification 
by a senior advocate attesting to a substantial legal issue in the plea for 
reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s decision to cancel the licenses.  The 
Supreme Court heard and denied a similar petition in April 2012.  See Dhananjay 
Mahapatra, 15 Days On, 2G Scam Curative Not Decided, TIMES OF INDIA, Jan. 26, 
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instance of retrospective government enforcement creating 
potential business uncertainty, the national government 
announced in May of 2012 that it might retroactively tax 
Vodafone’s purchase of an Indian phone company, which could 
lead to billions of dollars in tax implications.  Following the 
decision, “many fear that such arbitrary interventions will scare 
away foreign investment.”49  Given India’s interests in attracting 
foreign investment, albeit while balancing other national 
objectives, policy-makers may find corruption’s destabilizing effect 
on businesses particularly troubling.50 
Indian domestic investors have expressed similar concerns 
about a corrupt business environment in India.  A 2011 KPMG 
survey among Indian corporate figures concluded, “[H]igh-level 
corruption and scams over the past two years are now threatening 
to derail the country’s credibility, especially in the international 
arena, and the economic boom witnessed especially since 
liberalization.”51  Domestic investors looking for a more stable 
business environment may direct their investments elsewhere as 
corruption undermines their confidence in the Indian economy. 
 
2013, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-01-26/india/36563889_1_ 
curative-petitions-review-petitions-etisalat-db-telecom-pvt (noting that the 
Supreme Court rejected reconsideration for all seven telecom companies that 
sought review in early 2012). 
49 Mehta, supra note 21.  
50 For example, during 2011, for the first time India began to allow one-
hundred percent foreign-owned retailers to operate in India.  See Margherita 
Stancati, Retail FDI to Benefit Middlemen, Says Basu, WALL. ST. J. BLOG (Dec. 16, 
2011, 1:38 PM IST), http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/12/16/retail-fdi-
to-benefit-middlemen-says-basu/ (stating that the move could help curb inflation 
in India).  Public backlash to corruption scandals exacerbate investor fears.  For 
example, an India-based major Volkswagen-Eicher joint venture moved to China 
following political instability related to corruption.  See Patel, supra note 42, at 397. 
51 Press Release, KPMG, KPMG Unveils Survey on Bribery and Corruption 
(Mar. 14, 2011), at 1–2, http://www.kpmg.com/IN/en/Press%20Release/Press_ 
Release_Bribery_Corruption_Survey.pdf (describing that ninety-nine percent of 
respondents reported that corruption’s biggest impact was the “tendency to skew 
the level playing field and attract organisations with lesser capability to execute 
projects”).  Ninety percent of the survey’s respondents felt that corruption 
adversely effected stock market performance by increasing volatility and fifty-one 
percent of respondents expressed fear that rising corruption may detract foreign 
investment.  See KPMG, Survey on Bribery and Corruption 6–7, Jul. 7, 2011, 
[hereinafter KPMG survey], available at http://www.kpmg.com/IN/en/ 
IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/KPMG_Bribery_Survey_Re
port_new.pdf.  See also Pricewaterhouse Coopers, Confronting Corruption: The 
Business Case for an Effective Anti-Corruption Programme, Jan. 2008, at 2, available at 
http://www.pwc.com/en_TH/th/publications/ 
assets/confronting_corruption_printers.pdf (“Sixty-five percent of [global 
business executives surveyed] believe a level playing field is crucial to their 
company’s future business activities.”)  
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2. ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS IN INDIA 
India’s central government has engaged in an ongoing struggle 
against corruption particularly since the mid-1990s, when the 
country began to embrace economic liberalization following 
restrictive economic policies that characterized the period from 
independence until 1991.52  Amidst privatization, India’s political 
atmosphere emphasized anticorruption efforts.  Nonetheless, the 
years since then have demonstrated the country’s difficulties in 
combatting corruption.  For example, although the current 
opposition party, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), came to power in 
1996 on a political platform emphasizing anticorruption efforts, the 
party was “dogged by corruption scandals throughout its term.”53 
Government officials often solicit bribes to provide essential 
government services.54  One recent study evaluating a twelve-
month period found that fifty-four percent of Indian households 
paid a bribe to receive basic services.55  Nonetheless, ongoing 
efforts have focused on the demand rather than the supply of 
bribes all while providing that if caught, all bribe-givers, even 
those from whom a government official solicited a bribe for a basic 
and essential service, may be subject to certain minimum penalties.  
Additionally, an emphasis on criminal sanctions alone prevents 
 
52 The Industries Development and Regulation Act of 1951 required certain 
designated industries, constituting most of the manufacturing sector, to become 
subject to the central government’s industrial requirements.  The 1991 Statement 
of Industrial Policy eliminated this licensing regime except for in a small number 
of industries.  See William Greene, The Liberalization of India’s Telecommunications 
Sector: Implications for Trade and Investment 7–14 (U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n Office of 
Economics, Working Paper No. 2004-09-B, 2004) (narrating the legal 
developments contributing to liberalization of the telecommunications industry); 
Philippe Aghion et al., The Unequal Effects of Liberalization: Evidence from 
Dismantling the License Raj in India, 98 AMER. ECON. REV. 1397, 1410 (2008) 
(discussing the impact of de-licensing across different Indian states).  Some critics 
of the 2011 proposed anticorruption legislation have likened the creation of an 
independent ombudsman to monitor corruption to this restrictive economic 
regime often nicknamed, the “License Raj.”  See, e.g., Prashant Panday, License Raj, 
Police Raj….Now Get Ready For the Draconian Lokpal Raj…,  TIMES OF INDIA, Dec. 13, 
2011, http://blogs. timesofindia.indiatimes.com/the-real-truth/entry/license-raj-
police-raj-now-get-ready-for-the-draconian-lokpal-raj (providing a scathing 
critique of the legislation by a CEO of a major Indian company). 
53 Ray Marcelo, Corruption Scandals Take the Shine Off India’s Economic Success 
Story, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2003. 
54 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1520 (9th ed. 2009) (defining the solicitation of a 
bribe as “the crime of asking or enticing another to commit bribery”). 
55 Data and Methodology, 2010/11 GLOBAL CORRUPTION BAROMETER, 
TRANSPARENCY INT’L (2010), available at http://files.transparency.org/content/ 
download/398/1636/file/GCB20102011_FINAL_2_5_12_DH.xls. 
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Indian anticorruption authorities from engaging in a cooperative 
manner with private businesses. 
2.1.   India’s Attempts to Target the Demand-Side of Corruption 
There are a number of existing national statutes in India 
pertaining to combatting corruption.  The Prevention of 
Corruption Act of 1988 (PCA)56 prohibits a national or state public 
official,57 including employees of companies with government 
ownership,58 from accepting a gratuity,59 other than legal 
remuneration for performing an official act.60  The PCA prohibits 
officials from accepting anything of value without consideration 
from a person who transacts business or is concerned in official 
proceedings with the public servant.61  The Act also penalizes the 
perpetual acceptance of prohibited bribes and misappropriation of 
public funds, and potentially penalizes an official for possessing 
funds or property that are “disproportionate to his known sources 
of income” for which he cannot properly account.62   
The PCA does not explicitly criminalize the act of bribing a 
public official but permits penalizing a bribe-giver for abetting a 
public official’s acceptance of a bribe.63  The PCA also prohibits 
 
56  The Prevention of Corruption Act, No. 49 of 1988, PEN. CODE (India) § 7 
[hereinafter PCA]. 
57 The PCA broadly defines a public servant to include any person paid by 
the national government in commission of a public duty, in service or pay of local 
authorities, in service or pay of a corporation established by the central, 
provincial, or state government, or an authority or a body owned, controlled, or 
aided by the federal government.  The PCA does not apply to political parties or 
candidates.  Id. § 2(c). 
58 The PCA applies to government companies as defined by the Companies 
Act of 1956, § 617.  Id. § 2(b), (c).  For example, four executives of a subsidiary of 
the Life Insurance Company of India, a government company, were arrested in 
connection with a recent bribe-for-loan scandal.  See Nupur Acharya, A Ring-Side 
View: The Mortgage Bribery Arrests, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Nov. 25, 2010), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2010/11/25/a-ring-side-view-the-mortgage-
bribery-arrests. 
59 PCA §7(b) (including gratification beyond pecuniary benefits). 
60 Id. §7 (prohibiting the acceptance or attempts to obtain gratification in 
exchange for committing or forbearing to commit an official act, showing favor to 
a particular party, or rendering any service to any person). 
61 Id. § 11 (making liable any public official who, “accept[s] or obtains . . . any 
valuable thing without consideration, or for a consideration . . . from [sic] any 
person whom he knows to have been, or to be, or to be likely to be concerned in 
any proceeding or business transacted”). 
62 Id. § 13(1)(e) (detailing the prohibition on public servants taking bribes). 
63 See PCA § 12 (penalizing “[w]hoever abets an offence punishable under 
[PCA] section 7 or section 11 whether or not that offence is committed in 
consequence of that abetment”).  But see Anupama Jha, A Call For India to Join the 
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individuals from accepting any gratification to influence a public 
servant by corrupt or illegal means or by using personal 
influence.64  The Supreme Court has approved use of the abetting 
provision to penalize providers of bribes as abettors of bribery 
offenses, even when the underlying offense is not committed.65  
Additionally, India passed an anti-laundering statute in 2003 that 
penalizes intentionally or knowingly becoming involved in an 
activity or process related to the proceeds of a crime, including a 
corruption related offense.66  
The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) is the principle 
government agency responsible for enforcing the PCA.67  The 
Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) supervises and may direct 
CBI investigations of PCA offenses.68  Although the CBI has 
charged private bribe-givers with abetting PCA offenses, a review 
of cases since the PCA’s passage indicates that there are many 
more cases brought against public officials who accept bribes than 
there are cases against those who provide bribes.69  Moreover, the 
 
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery and UN Convention Against Corruption, 
INDIA L. NEWS (ABA Section of Int’l Law, India Comm.), Spring 2011, at 29 
(discussing limitations of this abetment approach especially where the underlying 
offense is not committed). 
64 See id. §§ 7, 8 (prohibiting any individual from accepting or attempting to 
obtain gratification as motive or reward for illegally or corruptly inducing a 
public official to engage in or to forbear any official act, to show favor to a 
particular party, or to render any service to any person); id. § 9 (prohibiting any 
individual from accepting or attempting to obtain any gratification as motive or 
reward for using his/her personal influence to influence a public official). 
65 See, e.g., Central Bureau of Investigation v. V.C. Shukla, A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 
1406, ¶¶ 56, 57 (India) (reasoning that bribe-givers could be held liable by reading 
PCA § 12 in conjunction with IPC § 107, which provides that an abettor can be 
penalized with the punishment of the underlying offense if he/she does anything 
at the time of or prior to the commission of the offense to “facilitate the 
commission” of the offense “and thereby facilitates the commission thereof”).  See 
also IPC § 107 (providing that a party can abet a criminal offense by: (1) instigating 
a person to do the offense; (2) engaging in a conspiracy to commit an offense; or 
(3) by act or illegal omission, intentionally aiding the commission of the offense). 
66 See The Prevention of Money Laundering Act of 2002, No. 15 of 2003, § 3 
(providing a minimum three year prison sentence and fine for a violation). 
67 See Delhi Special Police Establishment Act of 1946 (DSPE Act), No. 25 of 
1946 (establishing the CBI Anticorruption Division). 
68 See id. § 4 (describing the administrative structure of the police 
establishment); Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) Act of 2003, No. 45 of 2003, 
§ 8 (India) (granting the CVC statutory authority). 
69 The author bases this determination on her own review of case law 
contained in Supreme Court and high court records and in commercial databases 
of Indian cases.  See, e.g., MANUPATRA, http://www.manupatrafast.in/ (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2013).  A search of cases citing an abetment offense found only 
two hundred cases since the bill’s inception, whereas a similar search for citations 
to provisions for primary offenses discovered well over one thousand cases.  
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PCA’s categorization of bribe-giving as an abetting offense has, 
since the passage of the PCA, placed the criminality of providing a 
bribe into question.70  In addition, news reports indicate a clear 
emphasis on penalizing principal offenders under the PCA—the 
public officials demanding or accepting bribes.  As one news 
organization explains, “The [anticorruption] law has so far been 
focused on corruption among public servants, leaving the private 
sector out of the ambit . . . .”71 
India’s current anticorruption regime has been the subject of a 
number of criticisms.  In particular, critics complain that 
enforcement agencies lack adequate power and resources and have 
failed to take action in a number of cases.  Critics point out that 
CBI, which has roughly 10,000 cases pending trial, is under-
resourced and directly subject to government control.72  The CBI 
director also cited inadequate resources an ongoing problem and 
called for “‘greater functional autonomy for the agency.’”73  A 
number of restrictions limit the CVC’s and CBI’s powers.  The PCA 
requires the central government’s sanction to penalize employees 
of the central government or entities established, owned, or 
controlled by it.74  The Act also requires a state government’s prior 
 
Although this method is not an exact science, it strongly suggests that there are 
substantially more cases brought for principal offenses than abetting offenses. 
70 See, e.g., State of Uttar Pradesh v. Udai Narayan, (1999) Supp. (4) S.C.R. 255 
(India) (rejecting a defendant’s assertion that the CBI could not bring PCA charges 
against someone who was not a public servant). 
71 Private Sector Graft May Be Made Crime Too: PM, INDIA CSR, Oct. 22, 2011, 
http://www.indiacsr.in/en/?p=2822. 
72 See Interview by Ajay Vaishnav with Joginder Singh, Former Director of 
the CBI, TIMES OF INDIA (Jan. 11, 2012, 12:00AM IST), http://articles. 
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-01-11/edit-page/30612267_1_cbi-case-cbi-
director-central-bureau (supporting an independent CBI and complaining of the 
lengthy government sanction process and CBI’s backlog). 
73 See Liz Mathew & Sahil Makkar, PM Calls for Changes in Laws to Criminalize 
Private Sector Bribery, LIVEMINT.COM & WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 2011, 
http://www.livemint.com/2011/10/22003519/PM-calls-for-changes-in-laws-
t.html?h=B (announcing government plans to criminalize private sector bribery). 
74 See PCA § 19 (1)(a) (providing that “[n]o court shall take cognizance”  of 
alleged PCA offenses without such sanction).  The Supreme Court of India has 
said there is no judicial review of decisions to grant or not to grant sanction to 
conduct an investigation.  Rather, a court can only remand for reconsideration.  
See State of Punjab v. Bhatti, (2009) 12 S.C.R. 790, ¶ 7 (India) (“It is . . . well settled 
that the Superior Courts cannot direct the sanctioning authority either to grant 
sanction or not to do so.”).  See also State of Himachal Pradesh v. Nishant Sareen, 
A.I.R. 2011 S.C. 404, ¶ 8 (India) (“The object underlying Section 19 [of the PCA] is 
to ensure that a public servant does not suffer harassment on false, frivolous us, 
concocted or unsubstantiated allegations.”). 
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approval before investigation a state government employee.75  
Moreover, the PCA forbids police officers below a certain rank 
from investigating PCA violations without a judicial order.76  The 
Act applies “to all citizens of India outside India,”77 contains no 
exceptions for facilitation payments or corporate hospitality, and 
requires no minimum bribe amount to establish a violation. 
Though the CVC is somewhat more autonomous than the CBI, 
the agency only has the power to make recommendations to the 
CBI and it is subject to the restraints summarized above.78  In its 
proposed National Anticorruption Strategy, the CVC itself noted, 
“significant gaps still remain between the policy and practice.”79  
The CVC further wrote that, though existing anticorruption efforts 
are mostly punitive, “it is important that India shifts from this 
punitive approach to a more holistic preventive and participatory 
approach.”80  Perhaps indicating a shift in CVC enforcement 
policies, the CVC has begun urging government agencies to enter 
into “Integrity Pacts” with procurement contract bidders in which 
parties promise not to pay, offer, demand, accept bribes, or collude 
with competitors to obtain a procurement contract.81 
Activists also complain of the public’s inadequate role in 
anticorruption efforts, a lack of whistleblower protection, and the 
exacerbating effect of the backlog in Indian courts.82  Witnesses 
 
75 See PCA § 19 (1)(b)(requring state sanction for penalty of an employee who 
is only removable with the sanction of that state government). 
76 See id. § 17 (requiring police officers to obtain a judicial warrant to conduct 
a PCA investigation) 
77 See id. § 1(2). 
78 See CVC Act of 2003, supra note 68, § 8(1) (“[T]he [CVC] shall not exercise 
powers in such a manner so as to require the . . . investigat[ion] or dispos[ition] of 
any case in a particular manner.”).  Moreover, the CVC’s authority is limited to 
employees of the central government and government corporations.  Id. 
79 CVC, DRAFT NATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY 6 (Sept. 20, 2010), 
available at http://cvc.nic.in/NationalAntiCorruptionStrategydraft.pdf. 
80 Id. 
81 See CVC, The Integrity Pact, available at http://cvc.gov.in/vscvc/intpact.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2013) (identifying integrity pacts as tools to help combat 
corruption in public contracting).  See also Michael H. Wiehen, Member, Advisory 
Council, Transparency Int’l, Transparency, Accountability and Integrity in Public 
Procurement: Instruments Developed, Lessons Learned (Nov. 30, 2006), available 
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/54/37954020.pdf) (advocating similar 
integrity pacts); Draft Agenda, OECD, OECD Global Forum on Governance: 
Fighting Corruption and Promoting Integrity in Public Procurement, at 17 (Oct. 6, 
2004) (noting that Integrity Pacts have been used to reduce costs and corruption, 
particularly in Latin America).  
82 See, e.g., Harpreet Oberoi, Backlog of Cases in Indian Courts—The Way Out, 
NAT’L BAR ASSOC. OF INDIA, http://nationalbarindia.org/articles/4/backlog-of-
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often feel intimidated from testifying,83 and private individuals 
looking to enforce their rights often have only limited access to 
courts.84  Although the PCA provides that a prosecutor may not 
use a bribe-giver’s statement in a PCA proceeding against a public 
official as evidence of the bribe-giver’s abetment, India lacks 
comprehensive whistleblower protections.85  Nonetheless, there 
have been some efforts to increase transparency to permit private 
individuals to uncover corrupt practices.  For example, the Indian 
Parliament passed the Right to Information Act of 2005, which 
provides individuals with a means of acquiring information 
pertaining to public procurement and contracts.86  Additionally, 
the CVC has directed its local offices to prevent public officials 
from taking punitive actions against whistleblowers who report 
corruption activities, although the effect of this measure is 
unclear.87 
2.2.   Pending Demand-Oriented Anticorruption Efforts 
Corruption dominated the Indian political and public agendas 
during 2010 and 2011.  The 2010 Commonwealth Games were 
 
cases-in-indian-courts-the-way-out/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2013) (asserting that the 
elimination of corruption is essential to reducing the backlog in the courts). 
83 See Ray Marcelo, Corruption Scandals Take the Shine Off India’s Economic 
Success Story, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2003 (“Witnesses are being threatened, then they 
don’t support the prosecution’s case, and the prosecution fails.”) (quoting Justice 
Jeevan Reddy). 
84 In one evaluation, India ranked relatively well compared to countries in its 
income level in terms of a relatively open government, a functioning system of 
checks and balances, and an independent judiciary, but ranked relatively poorly 
in terms of its civil court system, police discrimination and abuses, and access to 
justice, “particularly in the areas of court congestion, enforcement, and delays in 
processing cases . . . .”  See Mark David Agrast, et al., THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT 
WORLD OF LAW INDEX 2011, 30 (2011), available at http://worldjusticeproject.org/ 
sites/default/files/WJP_Rule_of_Law_Index_2011_Report.pdf. 
85 PCA § 24 (providing that a person’s statement made in a proceeding 
against a public official for alleged PCA violations that he/she agreed to offer a 
bribe may not be used to subject such person to abetment prosecution). 
86 See generally Right to Information Act, No. 22 of 2005, as amended up to 
Feb. 1, 2011; Leonid Peisakhin & Paul Pinto, Is Transparency an Effective Anti-
Corruption Strategy? Evidence from a Field Experiment in India, 4 REG. & GOVERNANCE 
261 (2010).  For a discussion of retaliation against private citizens who attempted 
to use the law, see Jason Burke, Dying for Data: The Indian Activist Killed for Asking 
Too Many Questions, GUARDIAN, Dec. 27, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
world/2010/dec/27/india-rti-activists-deaths. 
87 See CVC, Government of India Resolution on Public Interest Disclosure and 
Protection of Informer, Office Order No. 33/5/2004, at para. 2(ii) (May 17, 2004) 
(“The [Central Vigilance Office] is to ensure that no punitive action is taken . . . 
against any person on perceived reasons/suspicion of being ‘whistle blower.’”).  
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fraught with allegations of corruption, which led to highly 
publicized government probes into corruption allegations.88  In 
March 2011, several activists began actively requesting a number of 
government investigations into CBI inaction.89  By October 2011, 
Prime Minister Singh announced that the government was 
considering changes to its bribery laws.90  Following the central 
government’s announcement of proposed anticorruption 
legislation, it entered into negotiations with activists who proposed 
the creation of a national, politically independent ombudsman 
with investigatory powers to launch corruption investigations and 
prosecutions.91 
After massive protests and a highly publicized fast by a 
prominent anticorruption activist, the central government 
introduced a compromise bill.92  The compromise bill would 
establish an ombudsman, or Lokpal, to serve as the primary 
prosecution wing in response to anticorruption complaints,93 with 
 
88 See J. Balaji, Centre Orders Probe Into CWG Issues, HINDU, Oct. 15, 2010, 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article832511.ece (ordering a 
government investigation into allegations of corruption and bribery in 
government expenditures for the Commonwealth games). 
89 For example, the organization wrote a letter to Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh and the Haryana Chief Minister requesting a CBI investigation into 
“‘irregularities in the forest department’” based on findings of a central 
government-established inquiry committee.  Although the committee reported 
strong evidence of corruption against various officials, the state government did 
not request a CBI investigation.  See Top Activists for CBI Probe in Whistleblower 
Case, TIMES OF INDIA, Mar. 22, 2011, 
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-03-22/india/ 29173809_1_cbi-
inquiry-cbi-probe-social-activists.  
90 See Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Address at the Biennial Conference 
of CBI and State Anti-Corruption Bureau (Oct. 21, 2011), 
http://pmindia.nic.in/content_print.php?nodeid=1073&nodetype=2 (“[W]e have 
introduced a Bill . . . to make bribery of foreign public officials an offence . . .[and] 
. . .are considering changes in our laws to criminalize private sector bribery.”).  
91 Critics note that an ombudsman may also be prone to corruption.  See, e.g., 
Ex-CVC Opposes Anna’s Formula, Advocates 2T Mantra, INDIAN EXPRESS, Sept., 9, 
2011, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/excvc-opposes-annas-formula-
advocates-2t/844255/ (quoting a former CVC commissioner who described the 
Lokpal as “a gargantuan institution” and quipped, “Ultimately who will ensure 
all officials under Lokpal are not corrupt?”). 
92 See Victory for Anna, Parliament Adopts ‘Sense of House’ on Lokpal Bill, TIMES 
OF INDIA, Aug. 27, 2011, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Victory-for-
Anna-Parliament-adopts-sense-of-House-on-Lokpal-
Bill/articleshow/9761344.cms (describing the negotiations between Anna Hazare, 
a leading anticorruption activist, and the central government). 
93 The Lokpal and Lokayuktas Bill, 2011, No. 134-C of 2011, § 12 [hereinafter 
Lokpal Bill].  The Act also calls for the establishment of similar ombudsman 
offices, or Lokayuktas, on the state level.  Id. § 64.  Some states already have 
similar institutions.  See, e.g., About Us, Office of the Lokayukta, GOV’T OF DELHI, 
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jurisdiction over the Prime Minister, national ministers, and 
members of Parliament.94  The bill would impose timeliness 
standards by requiring the Lokpal members95 to complete 
investigations and subsequent trials within one year, creating a 
total maximum processing time of two years.96  The bill would also 
provide whistleblower protections, establish a public grievance 
process, and require the ombudsman to publish a list of received 
and ongoing cases each year.97  While the lower parliamentary 
house passed the compromise bill during the final week of 2011, 
the upper house adjourned their final session of 2011 without 
voting on the bill.98  As of this writing, the Lokpal Bill remains 
pending in India’s upper parliamentary house.99  The lower 
parliamentary house also passed a whistleblower protection bill, 
although the bill has since been tabled in the upper house of 
parliament.100  
 
http:// 
delhi.gov.in/wps/wcm/connect/doit_lokayukta/Lokayukta/Home/About+Us 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2013) (describing the Delhi’s Lokayukta function to “inquire 
into the allegations against Public Functionaries” in Delhi). 
94 Id. §§ 2, 3, 14.  The Act would bar the Lokpal from investigations into 
complaints against the Prime Minister pertaining to international relations, 
external and internal security, public order, and atomic energy and space, unless 
three-quarters of the full Lokpal voted in favor of the investigation.  Id. § 14 (1)(a). 
95 The President would appoint members of the Lokpal after obtaining the 
recommendations of a Selection Committee consisting of the Prime Minister, the 
Speaker of the House of the People, the Leader of Opposition in the House of the 
People, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or another justice he/she 
nominates, and another “eminent jurist” nominated by the President.  Id. § 4(1).  
The Cabinet Secretary and Election Commission would supervise the Lokpal.  For 
a critique of the Lokpal, including that members of the body are not elected, but 
appointed for a five-year period, and that the impeachment process is “tedious,” 
see Panday, supra note 52.  But see Lokpal Bill, supra note 93, § 37–38 (providing a 
mechanism for receiving complaints against Lokpal members that involves the 
President). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 See Jim Yardley, Bill to Create Anticorruption Agency Stalls in India, N. Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 29, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/30/world/asia/ 
anticorruption-bill-stalls-in-adjourning-india-
parliament.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=india %20corruption&st=cse (describing the 
deliberations in Parliament). 
99 Sandeep Dikshit, Lokpal Bill Hits Fresh Road Block, HINDU, May 21, 2012, 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/lokpal-bill-hits-fresh-road-
block/article3442748.ece.  See generally Lokpal Bill: Govt Version vs Civil Society 
Version, TIMES OF INDIA, Apr. 7, 2011, 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow /7892134.cms (comparing 
proposed versions of the Lokpal Bill). 
100 See The Public Interest Disclosure and Protection to Persons Making the 
Disclosures Bill, 2010, No. 97 of 2010 (establishing a mechanism to register 
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2.3.    Limitations of India’s Approach to Combatting Corruption 
The pending Lokpal Bill may or may not encourage effective 
enforcement of the PCA—nonetheless, it fails to address two 
central shortcomings of India’s current anticorruption regime.  
First, the proposed legislation will not change Indian 
anticorruption laws’ emphasis on penalizing government 
officials—not on dissuading individuals and corporations from 
providing bribes.  Second, the legislation will not alter India’s 
current emphasis on criminal prosecution over cooperative 
agreements with private parties.  
Because India’s current and proposed anticorruption laws do 
not recognize bribe-giving as a principal offense, there are formal 
limitations on how the government can effectively target the 
supply of bribery.  For example, penalizing the supply of 
corruption as an abetting offense potentially limits corporate 
liability under the PCA.  For instance, while a bribe-giver may be 
penalized as an abettor or for accepting gratification to influence a 
public servant in the conduct of an official act, it is not clear to 
what degree a business organization on whose behalf the abettor is 
acting can be penalized under the PCA.  For example, in 2012, 
allegations arose that an equipment lobbyist offered a bribe of 
nearly three million U.S. dollars, on behalf of Tatra, a private Czech 
company, to the Army Chief General to secure the army’s purchase 
of substandard specialized military vehicles.  Although CBI is 
investigating the government officials’ roles, it is unclear whether 
CBI can or will bring charges against Tatra as the indirect source 
behind the offered bribes.101  This instance demonstrates the limits 
of corporate liability under the PCA as a mechanism to target 
companies involved in bribing public officials.   
Targeting the demand for bribes without also penalizing 
supply also creates a free-rider problem.  If corporations and 
individuals are not subject to penalties for providing bribes, it 
behooves them to continue bribing because they are unsure if other 
 
complaints of corruption against a public official and providing safeguards for 
whistleblowers).  The central government also proposed a right to services bill 
that would impose penalties on government officials for failure to deliver certain 
public services.  See generally The Right of Citizens for Time Bound Delivery of 
Goods and Services and Redressal of Their Grievances Bill, No. 131 of 2011; 
Grievance Redress Bill to Complement Lokpal Bill, HINDU, Nov. 3, 2011, 
http://www.thehindu. com/news/national/article2592661.ece. 
101 Vinay Kumar, Army Chief Names Tejinder in His Complaint to CBI, THE 
HINDU, Mar. 31, 2012, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article3265907 
.ece (describing a complaint to CBI concerning the government official involved). 
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companies are using bribes.102  Furthermore, this emphasis on 
demand rather than supply fails to recognize that the private sector 
is often a source of unsolicited bribes.  In a 2011, KPMG survey of 
business practitioners in India, sixty-eight percent of respondents 
reported a belief that in many cases, individuals in the private 
sector initiated bribe-giving.  Moreover, a majority of respondents 
felt that the proposed Lokpal legislation would have no impact on 
the level of corruption in India.103  However, the survey indicated 
that a majority of corporate respondents were supportive of 
legislation that would penalize the providers of bribes.104  
Adoption of domestic statutes that penalize providers of bribes 
will help to deter corruption and to level the playing field between 
companies that choose to engage in corruption and those that do 
not.  Domestic legislation targeting the supply of corruption will 
help ameliorate fears amongst some companies that strict 
enforcement of the FCPA, the Bribery Act, and other foreign 
legislation makes conducting business in India too risky. 
Additionally, the PCA only provides for criminal prosecution, 
which limits the enforcement mechanisms available under India’s 
anticorruption regime.  The PCA provides no method of civil 
enforcement of the sort available to the U.S. Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) under the FCPA.  Additionally, India’s 
anticorruption regime makes no use of settlement arrangements of 
the sort that the United States has predominantly relied upon in 
enforcing the FCPA and that evidence suggests the United 
Kingdom will utilize in enforcing the Bribery Act. 
3.  PROHIBITIONS ON BRIBERY 
3.1.   Anti-bribery Offenses, Exceptions, and Defenses under the FCPA 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is a U.S. statute that 
restricts bribery of foreign officials, even extraterritorially, and 
requires affected corporations to maintain books and records that 
accurately and fairly reflect corporate transactions.  The U.S. 
Congress passed the FCPA following a number of corruption 
scandals during the 1970s.105  Since then, and particularly in recent 
 
102 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
103 KPMG, supra note 51 at 8, 12–14 (surveying respondents about the 
influence of bribery on conducting business in India).  
104 Id. at 15. 
105 The U.S. Congress unanimously passed the FCPA in 1977 following 
prosecutions for illegal use of corporate funds arising out of the Watergate 
scandal.  See Criminal Division of DOJ & Enforcement Division of the SEC, A 
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years, the United States has aggressively prosecuted international 
bribery.106 
The FCPA makes it a criminal offense to give or offer anything 
of value to a foreign official,107 foreign political party, official, or 
candidate “to assist in obtaining or retaining business . . . or 
directing business to, any person.”108  This anti-bribery offense 
pertains to individuals and various corporate actors.109  The Act 
covers not only direct actions of a company or its employees, but 
also indirect payments made through third parties with knowledge 
that the recipient will use all or any portion of the payment to bribe 
 
Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 14, 2010), at 3, 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf [hereinafter FCPA 
Resource Guide].  See also S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 4 (1977) (Comm. Rep.) (finding 
that corporate bribery “is fundamentally destructive” to the basic principal that 
“[i]n our free market system it is basic that the sale of products should take place 
on the basis of price, quality and service.”); H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4–5 (1977) 
(reporting that such bribes “erode[d] public confidence in the integrity of the free 
market system[,]” “embarrass[ed] friendly governments, [and] lower[ed] the 
esteem for the United States among the citizens of foreign nations”). 
106 Although there are some indications that FCPA prosecutions were down 
in 2012, the number that year still exceeded prosecutions in any year prior to 2008.  
See GIBSON DUNN, 2012 YEAR-END FCPA UPDATE 1 (2013), available at 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2012YearEndFCPAUpdate.as
px (noting that the drop in prosecutions is likely a result in resource management 
but not a prediction of future decreases in enforcement). 
107 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1.  “Foreign official” includes government employees, 
including elected or appointed officials, and of the military as well an 
“instrumentality thereof.”  Id. at (a)(1)(B).  See United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831 
(5th Cir. 1991) (holding that the U.S. government could not prosecute foreign 
officials for conspiring to violate the FCPA).  The DOJ and the SEC have 
construed “instrumentalities” to encompass state-owned enterprises and federal 
district courts have affirmed these designations.  See generally “State-Owned 
Enterprises” Under the FCPA, NEWSLETTER (Steptoe and Johnson LLP, Washington, 
D.C.), June 3, 2011, at 1, available at http://www.steptoe.com/publications-
newsletter-209.html (discussing the FCPA’s application to state-owned 
enterprises). 
108 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1)(B).  The DOJ has interpreted “obtaining or 
retaining business” beyond the scope of a mere award or renewal of contract for 
government business.  See generally FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 105, at 12. 
109 Including any U.S. citizen, national, or resident and any corporation and 
other business entity organized under the laws of the United States or with its 
principal place of business in the United States.  The FCPA bribery offense also 
covers any foreign corporation listed on any U.S. stock exchange or that is 
required to file reports under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.  See 15 
U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a).  The bribery offense also pertains to individuals acting on 
behalf of such companies or individuals, such as company officers, directors, 
employees, agents, or stockholders.  See id.; Rina Pal & James Parkinson, The U.S. 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Doing Business in India, 2 INDIA L. NEWS (Am. Bar 
Ass’n Section of Int’l Law, Washington D.C.), Spring 2011, at 5. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss4/11
SOLOMON_REVISED (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2014  1:23 PM 
2013] CORRUPTION IN INDIA 925 
foreign officials.110  Courts have confirmed the supply-oriented 
perspective of the FCPA by holding that it does not pertain to the 
recipient of a bribe.111  Penalties, either civil or criminal, under the 
FCPA focus on the purpose of a payment and intent of the briber, 
rather than the amount of the bribe.112  Under U.S. law and the 
theory of respondeat superior, a corporation may be liable for 
employee actions in violation of the FCPA, even if the company 
did not sanction the actions in question, so long as the employee 
acted within the apparent scope of his or her employment.113 
The FCPA does not prohibit ‘facilitation’ payments, or the 
payment, gift, offer, or promise of payments intended to expedite 
or secure the performance of a routine and nondiscretionary 
government action.114  A routine governmental action does not 
include the award or continuance of business with a particular 
party.115  The FCPA also provides two affirmative defenses.  The 
first pertains to where the alleged bribe “was lawful under the 
written laws and regulations of the foreign official’s . . . country.”116  
 
110 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(3) (“[A]ny person, while knowing that all or a 
portion of such money or thing of value will be offered, given, or promised, 
directly or indirectly, to any foreign official . . . .”).  When required, the knowledge 
of a particular circumstance requirement “is established if a person is aware of a 
high probability of the existence of such circumstance, unless the person actually 
believes that such circumstance does not exist.”  See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(2)(B).  
See also Patel, supra note 42 (stating that cases have imputed knowledge where an 
entity was willfully blind to misconduct or consciously avoided examining red 
flags).  A company merging or acquiring another company may inherit liability 
under for past violations of the FCPA and so companies are likely to conduct 
FCPA-related due diligence before acquiring or merging with another company.  
See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Opinion Procedure, 28 C.F.R. § 80 (1992). 
111 See generally Castle, 925 F.2d. 831.  The DOJ has charged certain foreign 
official recipients of bribes with related crimes including money laundering.  See, 
e.g., Press Release, DOJ Office of Public Affairs, Two Florida Executives, One 
Florida Intermediary and Two Former Haitian Government Officials Indicted for 
Their Alleged Participation in Foreign Bribery Scheme (Dec. 7, 2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/December/09-crm-1307.html 
112 FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 105, at 15. 
113 Id. at 27. 
114 International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 
78dd-3(b).  The Act defines a routine government action as one “which is 
ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official” and gives several 
concrete examples of what constitutes a routine government action, including 
providing police protection, postage services, scheduling needed inspections, 
obtaining necessary permits, and processing governmental papers such as visas. 
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(f)(3)(a). 
115 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3. 
116 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(c)(1).  In 2005, the DOJ reported that it was unaware of 
any instances or Opinion Releases that explicitly addressed this defense.  See U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Response of the U.S.: Questions Concerning Phase 2, §4.1(e) 
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The second defense is available when the alleged bribe “was a 
reasonable and bona fide expenditure, such as travel and lodging 
expenses,” incurred on behalf of the foreign official.117 
3.2.   Anti-bribery Offenses and Defenses under the Bribery Act 
Unlike the FCPA, which only covers the supply of bribes to 
foreign officials, the Bribery Act consolidates the United 
Kingdom’s prohibitions on both domestic and foreign bribery into 
one statute.  Like the FCPA, the Bribery Act penalizes the supply of 
bribes to foreign officials.  The United Kingdom enacted the 
Bribery Act in April 2010, consolidating and amending existing 
anti-bribery laws “from a patchwork of common law to 
comprehensive legislation.”118  The Act forbids a person,119 either 
directly or through a third party,120 from b ribing121 a foreign public 
 
(responding to an OECD report evaluating U.S. anticorruption efforts).  The 
OECD Convention also mirrors the FCPA exceptions for payments made in 
jurisdictions where such payments are legal.  See Commentaries on the Convention 
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, 
OECD, Nov. 21, 1997, at 8 [hereinafter OECD Convention Commentaries] 
(outlining these exceptions). 
117 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(c)(2)(A), (B) (describing that the bona fide expense 
must be “directly related” to either “the promotion, demonstration, or explanation 
of products or services” or “the execution or performance of a contract with a 
foreign government [or government agency]”). 
118 Margaret Ryznar & Samer Korkor, Anti-Bribery Legislation in the United 
States and United Kingdom: A Comparative Analysis of Scope and Sentencing, 76 MO. L. 
REV. 415, 420 (2011).  Pressure to adopt amended legislation began in 2007, after 
the SFO dropped an investigation into alleged bribes that BAE Systems paid in 
connection to a £43 billion arms deal between the British government, Saudi 
Arabia, and BAE Systems.  Subsequently, the House of Lords held that the SFO 
was entitled to drop its investigation due to concerns about resulting risks to 
British security should Saudi Arabia withhold intelligence.  See generally BAE and 
the Saudi Arms Deal: Timid Justice, THE ECONOMIST, July 31, 2008, 
http://www.economist.com/node/11848360.  Explanatory notes accompanying 
the Bribery Act indicate that the British Parliament intend for the offense of 
bribing a foreign official to follow closely the OECD requirements.  See generally 
Ministry of Justice, Explanatory Notes Relating to Bribery Act 2010 (c. 23), ¶ 34, 
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES, available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/ notes/contents [hereinafter 
Bribery Act Explanatory Notes]. 
119 See Bribery Act § 16 (“This Act applies to individuals in the public service 
of the Crown as it applies to other individuals.”) 
120 See Bribery Act § 6(3)(a) (establishing that use of a third party would not 
diminish liability). 
121 See id. (defining a bribe as the offer, promise, or giving of any financial or 
other advantage).  
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official122 with the intention123 of influencing the official in his or 
her official capacity124 in order to obtain or retain business or an 
advantage in the conduct of business.125 
Like the FCPA, the Bribery Act applies extra-territorially.126  A 
corporate entity and certain corporate officers127 can be held 
criminally liable if the offense was committed with the officer’s 
consent or connivance and if the organization was incorporated, 
formed, or carries on business in the United Kingdom.128  The 
Bribery Act also penalizes the failure of commercial organizations 
to prevent acts of bribery by an associated person.129 
 
122 See Bribery Act § 6(5) (including an elected or appointed individual who 
holds a legislative, administrative, or judicial position and exercises a public 
function on behalf of a foreign country or public international organization). 
123 Explanatory notes accompanying the Act indicate that an individual must 
intend to influence a foreign public official in his/her official functions, whether or 
not the official has the authority to use the position in that way, and the offending 
individual must intend to obtain to obtain or retain business or an advantage in 
conducting business.  See Bribery Act Explanatory Notes, supra note 118, 44–45. 
124 See Bribery Act § 6(4) ( including an omission to exercise those functions, 
and any use of the official’s position, even outside of the official’s authority). 
125  See id. § 6(1), (2) (describing the briber’s necessary intention). 
126 The Act applies where any act or omission that forms part of the offence 
takes place in the United Kingdom or where conduct that violates the Act occurs 
outside of the United Kingdom and the person or entity has a close connection 
with the country.  See id. §§ 12(1), (2); 14(4)(a)–(i) (defining a close connection).  A 
number of observers have noted this broad scope.  See, e.g., Michelle Duncan, 
Palmina Fava & Samantha Kakat, A Comparison of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act and the U.K. Bribery Act, STAY CURRENT CLIENT ALERTS (Paul Hastings LLP, 
New York, N.Y.), Oct. 2010 at 1, available at http:// 
www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/1750.pdf (noting that the broad 
scope of the Act “creates several areas of uncertainty”). 
127 See Bribery Act, § 14(4) (defining a senior official). 
128 See id. §§ 12(5), 14.  Following a summary conviction, a defendant may be 
sentenced to imprisoned for up to twelve months and/or fined up to a statutory 
maximum.  For a conviction following an indictment, a defendant may be 
imprisoned for up to ten years and/or fined an unlimited amount.  Id. § 11(1); 
Bribery Act Explanatory Notes, supra note 118, para. 56.  A corporation or 
partnership found liable under the act is punishable by an unlimited fine.  Id. 
129 See Bribery Act § 7(1).  So long as the commercial organization has a close 
connection to the United Kingdom, it does not matter if the failure occurs 
elsewhere.  Id. § 12(5).  The Act specifies that a “person associated” is a person 
who perform services on behalf of the organization, including an employee, agent, 
or a subsidiary, and in consideration of all the relevant circumstances.  Id. § 8.  A 
commercial organization is defined as (1) a body incorporated under U.K. law; (b) 
any other corporate body which carries on a business, or part of a business, in the 
United Kingdom; (c) a partnership formed under U.K. law; (d) any other 
partnership which engages in a business, in whole or in part, in the United 
Kingdom.  Id. § 7(5).  Violations of the failure to prevent a bribery offense are 
punishable with an unlimited fine.  Id. § 11(3). 
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The Bribery Act offers a number of defenses.  Like the FCPA, 
the Bribery Act does not apply if the domestic law to which the 
foreign official is subject does not prohibit the foreign official from 
being influenced by the offer, promise, or gift.130  Unlike the FCPA, 
the Bribery Act offers corporations with a form of a compliance 
defense.  The statute provides a defense for the failure to prevent 
offense where the organization had “in place adequate procedures 
designed to prevent persons associated” with it from engaging in 
such conduct.131  The organization must demonstrate that it 
effectively administered and publicized its procedures, the 
procedures were adequately designed to prevent bribery, and the 
wrongdoer was a junior employee.132  Therefore, to insulate 
themselves from liability, companies now “have to play 
anticorruption roles too.”133  The Bribery Act instructs enforcing 
authorities to publish guidance on what amounts to adequate 
procedures.134  That guidance indicates that the agencies will apply 
a “common sense approach” in enforcing the failure to prevent 
offenses and sets out six principles with which they will evaluate 
compliance procedures.135 
The British Parliament rejected facilitation payment or 
corporate hospitality exceptions,136 but instead deferred these 
issues to the discretion of prosecutors who are instructed to take 
 
130 See id. § 6(3)(b) (stating that for the purposes of the Bribery Act, a bribe 
occurs only where the foreign official is not permitted by applicable law to be 
influenced by the offer, promise, or gift).  
131 Id. § 7(2). 
132 Id. 
133 Eric Gutierrez, Why Business Should Care About Fighting Corruption, Poverty 
Matters Blog, THE GUARDIAN (July 1, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-
development/poverty-matters/2011/jul/01/bribery-act-business-should-fight-
corruption (explaining the effect of the failure to prevent offense on businesses). 
134 See Bribery Act § 9. 
135 See Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010 Guidance 20–31 (March 2011), 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010-
guidance.pdf [hereinafter Justice Bribery Act Guidance] (establishing the 
following six principles: (1) proportionate procedures; (2) top-level commitment; 
(3) risk assessment; (4) due diligence; (5) communication (including training); and 
(6) monitoring and review). 
136 See Letter from Lord Tunnicliffe, Gov’t Spokesperson for the Ministry of 
Justice, to Lord Henley, House of Lords (Jan. 14, 2010) (responding to the 
introduction of a failed amendment to include such an exception in the Bribery 
Act).  The letter explains, “[C]orporate hospitality is an accepted part of modern 
business practice and the Government is not seeking to penalise expenditure on 
corporate hospitality for legitimate commercial purposes.  But lavish corporate 
hospitality can also be used as a bribe to secure advantages” and the law must be 
able to penalize these uses.  See id. 
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action “in the most appropriate cases.”137  The U.K. government 
issued guidance intending to “shed a lot of light on some of the 
issues concerning facilitation payments and hospitality . . . .”138 
Additionally, the guidance related the public interest factors that 
prosecutors will consider in deciding whether to prosecute a given 
case.139  The guidance also notes that a company’s voluntary 
notification to authorities of a facilitation payment because of the 
company’s proactive self-reporting procedures is likely to reduce 
penalties.140 
According to the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), an agency 
primarily responsible for enforcing the Bribery Act, a single 
incident will not necessarily indicate that a company has 
inadequate procedures.  The SFO explains that the statute does not 
intend “to penalise ethically run companies that encounter an 
isolated incident of bribery.”141  Nonetheless, there are indications 
that that the United Kingdom will enforce the Bribery Act in cases 
of nominal facilitation or hospitality payments.  For example, 
government-issued guidance indicates that facilitation payments 
 
137 See NICK KOCHAN & ROBIN GOODYEAR, CORRUPTION: THE NEW CORPORATE 
CHALLENGE 148 (2011) (describing various official statements concerning the 
choice of whether or not to prosecute facilitation payments and corporate 
hospitality under the Bribery Act). 
138  Richard Alderman, Dir. of the SFO, Speech, Hosted by McGrigors, Feb. 9, 
2011, http://web.archive.org/web/20110305211614/http://www.sfo.gov.uk 
/about-us/our-views/director’s-speeches/speeches-2011/the-bribery-act-2010---
the-sfo’s-approach-and-international-compliance.aspx 
139 See id.  The SFO Guidance cites a number of considerations favoring 
prosecution including the length of a likely sentence, premeditation, facilitation of 
more serious offenses, and abuses of positions of authority.  See U.K. SFO & 
Crown Prosecution Service, Bribery Act 2010: Joint Prosecution Guidance of the 
Director of the Serious Fraud Office and the Director of Public Prosecutions, at 7, 
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/media/167348/bribery_act_2010_joint_prosecution_gui
dance_of_the_director_of_the_serious_fraud_office_and_the_director_of_public_
prosecutions.pdf [hereinafter SFO Bribery Act Guidance] (listing considerations).  
The guidance also notes factors tending against prosecution, including a single 
small payment likely to result in only nominal penalties, a resulting harm that is 
minor or the result of an accident, and a “a genuinely proactive approach 
involving self-reporting and remedial action.”  Id.  See also Code for Crown 
Prosecutors, Jan. 2013, 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/code2013english.pdf (explaining 
that after prosecutors determine the sufficiency of evidence, they consider the 
public interest factors in favor of or against prosecution). 
140 The SFO Director recognized that banning facilitation payments might not 
be practical, especially for small firms, but explained that the Bribery Act sets 
aspirational goals of moving towards “zero tolerance” over time.  The SFO 
Director also encouraged companies to engage with the SFO because the office is 
less likely to prosecute offenses if a company has committed to an eventual zero-
tolerance policy.  See Alderman Speech, supra note 138. 
141 SFO Bribery Act Guidance, supra note 139, at 3.  
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paid as a standard way of conducting business may actually 
indicate premeditation and suggest that prosecution is 
appropriate.142  
3.3.    Recommended Anti-Bribery Offenses in India 
3.3.1.   Principle Offenses 
Given the limitations of India’s demand-oriented approach, as 
discussed in Section 2.3 above, the country’s anticorruption efforts 
would likely benefit from an amendment to the PCA making bribe-
giving a primary offense.  Furthermore, India’s Parliament should 
amend the PCA to address some form of supervisor liability.  Both 
the U.S. and the U.K. statutes impose some form of strict liability 
on a corporation for a bribe given by its employee or agent.  The 
United States accomplishes this aim through respondeat superior 
liability and the United Kingdom accomplishes this through its 
failure to prevent bribery offense, as discussed in previous 
sections.  Like these statutes, the Indian statute should impose 
liability on corporations for actions taken by employees and 
agents.  Supporting this point, one observer noted, “Nothing has 
increased the impact of the [FCPA] on corporations more than 
respondeat superior.”143 
Though respondeat superior is not without its critics, including 
some form of superior liability in India’s anticorruption efforts is 
essential to prevent corporate officers from evading liability while 
lower employees face penalties.  The Indian Penal Code already 
recognizes that a “person” in the criminal law context may include 
business entities.144  Some statutes provide specific statutory 
provisions of vicarious liability for corporate officers where such 
officers have knowledge of wrongdoing or fail to act with due 
 
142 See id. at 9 (describing premeditation as a factor favoring prosecution). 
143 Richard L. Cassin, Justice for Corporate Defendants?, FCPA BLOG (June 10, 
2008, 3:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/tag/respondeatsuperior? 
currentPage=7.  Some critics of supervisor liability point out that a senior 
executive of a company “may be no more culpable for corruption at lower levels 
of a company than a minister is for corruption at lower levels of his ministry.”  
Corporate Corruption, LIVEMINT.COM & WALL STREET J. (Oct. 22, 2011, 1:28 AM), 
http://www.livemint.com/2011/10/22012814/Quick-Edit--Corporate-
corrupt.html?d=1 (announcing the Prime Minister’s intention to criminalize 
corporate bribe-giving and the intended effect on businesses). 
144 See IPC § 11 (“‘[P]erson’ includes any Company or Association or body of 
persons, whether incorporated or not.”).  See generally V.S. Khanna, Corporate 
Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. R. 1477 (1996) 
(exploring the rationale and justifications for imposing criminal liability on 
corporations). 
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diligence.145  The Supreme Court of India has adopted a limiting 
stance for vicarious liability by clarifying, 
  
In order to trigger corporate criminal liability for the actions 
of the employee (who must generally be liable himself), the 
actor-employee who physically committed the offence must 
be the ego, the center of the corporate personality, the vital 
organ of the body corporate, the alter ego of the employer 
corporation or its directing mind.146   
 
Nonetheless, imposing a broader notion of vicarious liability on 
companies, one that potentially penalizes companies for all 
employee actions, not just those of central company officials, will 
help provide companies with the appropriate incentives to 
discourage employees from engaging in corrupt business practices. 
Additionally, imposing corporate criminal liability makes a 
company’s anticorruption efforts into an issue of corporate 
governance, and therefore, a matter of private law.  For instance, a 
company that incurs corporate liability may face shareholder 
litigation alleging a company’s corporate governance failures.147  
Shareholders become interested in ensuring that a company does 
not resort to bribery because of the associated reputational and 
 
145 See, e.g. The Negotiable Instruments Act, No. 26 of 1881, § 141 (India) 
(providing that persons in certain positions may be held liable for a company’s 
violations of that act).  In evaluating one such statutory provision, the Supreme 
Court of India recently held that an officer may only be held vicariously liable 
where the company is actually charged with committing a crime.  See Aneeta 
Hada v. M/S Godfather Travels & Tours, S.Ct., Crim. App. No. 838 of 2008 (India) 
(describing that a company officer with responsibility for the conduct of the 
company may be liable under the Negotiable Instruments Act § 141 only where 
the company is an offending party and where the person does not prove that the 
violation was committed without his/her knowledge or that he/she exercised due 
diligence to prevent the violation). 
146 Assistant Commissioner, Assessment- II, Bangalore and Ors. v. Velliappa 
Textiles Ltd. and Ors, A.I.R. (1) 2004 S.C. 86, ¶ 2 (India) (reasoning that because a 
corporation cannot be imprisoned, laws that mandatorily impose imprisonment 
cannot apply to corporations). 
147 See Frances Meadows, Corporate Governance and Corruption/Corporate 
Governance et Corruption, 5 INT’L L.F. D. INT’L 97, 97 (2003) (describing how 
corporate liability transforms anticorruption efforts into a matter of private law); 
Cases and Review Releases Relating to Bribes to Foreign Officials, FCPA DIGEST 
(Shearman & Sterling LLP, New York, N.Y.), Jan. 2013, at xiii, 
http://www.shearman.com/ files/Publication/287c1af0-f9cb-4c11-805d-
91c409975b41/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/83d9dc0b-b80c-4ca4-877b-
9efbba0952e7/FCPA-Digest-Jan2013_010213.pdf (“The year saw a slew of private 
litigation related to FCPA investigations and enforcement . . .  most were the usual 
derivative and securities class action lawsuits that follow FCPA disclosures . . . .”) 
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business costs of corporate liability.  As a result, a strong notion of 
corporate vicarious liability adds a body of private enforcers to an 
anticorruption regime. 
 
3.3.2.   Proposed Defenses and Exceptions to Supply-Oriented 
Anticorruption Offenses in India 
 
The incentives offered by respondeat superior are similar to those 
encouraged by the Bribery Act’s failure to prevent offense.  Under 
the theory of respondeat superior, a corporation cannot evade FCPA 
liability entirely by demonstrating that it had a compliance 
program.148  Yet, unlike the FCPA, the Bribery Act offers a defense 
for companies that implement “Adequate Procedures” to prevent 
bribery.  Even in the United States, a company’s compliance efforts 
may result in a reduced sentence.149  Moreover, U.S. prosecutors 
are also encouraged to consider such compliance programs as well 
as voluntary disclosures and a corporation’s past history in 
determining whether to charge a corporation.150 
Although the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has opposed 
amendments to introduce a compliance defense,151 critics have 
pointed out that penalizing a company regardless of compliance 
programs does “not adequately reward companies for sincere (and 
 
148 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8B2.1, pts. a, b, and c (2012) 
(detailing the meaning and purpose of an effective compliance and ethics 
program). 
149 The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines consider a pre-existing “reasonably 
designed, implemented, and enforced” compliance program which should lead a 
corporation to “exercise due diligence to prevent and detect criminal conduct.”  
Id.  Moreover, a failure to “prevent or detect” a violation of the FCPA is not itself 
determinative of the program’s effectiveness” although the sentencing guidelines 
advise that evidence of the effectiveness of a program should be considered.  Id. 
150 See U.S. Attorney Manual §§ 9–28.500 (2008) (“[I]t may not be appropriate 
to impose liability upon a corporation, particularly one with a robust compliance 
program in place, under a strict respondeat superior theory for the single isolated 
act of a rogue employee.”); Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Larry 
D. Thompson on the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations 
to the Heads of DOJ Components and U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003), 
http://justice.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm (providing general 
principles for federal prosecution of corporations). 
151 See Joe Palazzolo, U.S. Chamber Of Commerce Presses for Changes to FCPA, 
WALL ST. J. BLOG (Oct. 27, 2010, 10:45 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-
currents/2010/10/27/us-chamber-of-commerce-presses-for-changes-to-fcpa/ 
(describing proposed amendments).  The DOJ declared that it had “no intention 
whatsoever of supporting reforms whose aim is to weaken the FCPA and make it 
a less effective tool . . . .”  See Assistant Breuer speech, supra note 7. 
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expensive) efforts to stop the unwanted misbehavior of their 
employees.”152  Some practitioners have noted that, “This defense 
recognizes—in a way that the U.S. adherence to the respondeat 
superior doctrine does not—that robust compliance by companies 
should insulate the company from criminal liability.”153  The 
adequate procedures defense has led some observers to determine 
that the U.S. statute is more likely to deter foreign investment than 
its British counterpart.154 
Inclusion of an adequate procedures defense in Indian 
legislation may offer an added bonus of encouraging companies to 
monitor employees through adequate procedures and utilize 
corporate governance as a means of combatting corruption.  
Additionally, a corporate compliance defense may actually bolster 
anticorruption efforts by encouraging companies to adopt 
compliance programs because doing so may reduce a company’s 
potential liability under Indian anticorruption laws, but also under 
potential corporate governance liability through shareholder 
litigation.  For example, in the OECD’s 2002 investigation of the 
United States, it recognized both criminal prosecution as well as 
the role of corporate compliance programs in bolstering U.S. 
anticorruption efforts.155  The OECD’s report noted, “[C]orporate 
compliance programs are the single most important measure 
 
152 Interview by Mike Koehler with Joseph Covington, Former Chief of the 
Multinational Fraud Branch of DOJ (Oct. 4, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor 
.com/former-doj-fcpa-chief-supports-fcpa-compliance-defense (outlining 
arguments in favor of an FCPA compliance defense).  See also Mike Koehler, 
Revisiting A Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 609, 
617 (2012) (“[C]urrent FCPA enforcement environment thus does not adequately 
recognize a company’s good-faith commitment to FCPA compliance and does not 
provide good corporate citizens a sufficient return on their compliance 
investments.”) 
153 See Anti-Corruption Mid-Year Review, GLOBAL ANTI-CORRUPTION E-ALERT 
(Covington & Burlington LLP, Washington, D.C.), July 2011, at 1, available at 
http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/01a3d761-b8ca-421f-9932-
b0fef03c4219/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/68ac553e-2122-49fa-b270-
b38b69ff5215/Anti-Corruption%20Mid-Year%20Review%20-%20Beijing.pdf (last 
accessed Feb. 1, 2013) [hereinafter Covington Mid-Year Review]. 
154 See A Tale of Two Laws, supra note 7. 
155 OECD, REPORT ON APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING 
BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 
AND THE 1997 RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATTING BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 6 (2002), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/investment/briberyininternationalbusiness/anti-
briberyconvention/1962084.pdf (asserting that the combined effect of the FCPA, 
government enforcement, U.S. business practices, and a specialized bar of 
attorneys involved in anticorruption work contribute to the maturity of the U.S. 
anticorruption legal system). 
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contributing to prevention and deterrence.”156  Nonetheless, if 
India were to adopt this type of defense, it must involve actual 
investigations of business procedures and involve questions such 
as whether or not the business trained its employees.  Otherwise, 
an adequate procedures defense might become a vehicle for 
undermining liability. 
Adoption of a facilitations payment exception would similarly 
help India enforce its anticorruption efforts strategically.  
Facilitation payments receive varying treatment in national 
legislation and transnational conventions.  Both the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention and FCPA expressly exempt facilitation 
payments,157 while the Bribery Act explicitly rejects such an 
exception.158  The PCA contains no facilitation payments exception, 
and so an individual who pays a very small bribe to receive an 
essential service, such as water, in response to a demand from a 
public official may potentially face a minimum prison sentence 
under Section 12.159   
Yet corruption is so pervasive in India that many individuals 
report needing to bribe government officials to obtain routine 
government services.  A 2009 study reported that seventy-seven 
percent of reported bribes during its reporting period were 
“extortionate demands,” or demands relating things to which the 
reporter was entitled, such as the timely delivery of a service to 
 
156 Id. at 17. 
157 See OECD Convention Commentaries, supra note 116, at 15 (“Small 
‘facilitation’ payments do not constitute payments made “to obtain or retain 
business or other improper advantage’ within the meaning of paragraph 1 and, 
accordingly, are also not an offence.”).  Nonetheless, beginning in 2009, the OECD 
announced a new recommendation stating that countries should undertake 
periodic reviews to effectively combat facilitation payments, encourage 
companies to prohibit or discourage use of such payments, and that all such 
payments need to be accurately accounted for in company’s books and records.  
The OECD contextualized its recommendation “in view of the corrosive effect of 
small facilitation payments, particularly on sustainable economic development 
and the rule of law.”  OECD Working Grp. on Bribery in Int’l Bus. Transactions, 
Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials 
in Int’l Business Transactions, OECD, Nov. 26, 2009, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/40/44176910.pdf. 
158 It is notable that U.S. law governing domestic bribery does not exempt 
facilitation payments.  See generally 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2006).  Moreover, the OECD 
explains that most countries make facilitation payments paid domestically illegal 
and notes that it “does not seem a practical or effective complementary action” to 
have foreign countries impose criminal penalties for these payments.  See OECD 
Convention Commentaries, supra note 116, at 15.  
159 Violating public officials or abettors can be fined and and/or incarcerated 
for up to five years, and for at least six months.  See PCA § 7. 
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which the reporter was entitled and receiving owed payments.160  
Studies indicate that payments demanded are often small and 
frequent, particularly in industries such as trucking which require 
frequent interaction with government officials.161  Frustrations 
about such demands are rampant.  For example, during 2011, two 
farmers in a Northern Indian village dumped bags of snakes in a 
local tax office to protest officials’ alleged withholding of tax 
records while attempting to extort bribes.162  In fact, the focus on 
public officials, rather than the suppliers of bribes, in the current 
public campaign against corruption may be a response to the 
public’s frustration with these extortions.163  Penalizing individuals 
who require the services for which a government official demands 
a bribe may be unfair given that individuals often have no true 
choice but to pay these bribes.  A facilitation payment exception 
may help to address this reality and encourage reports of soliciting 
public officials. 
Given Indian public officials’ common solicitation of bribes, 
failing to provide a facilitation defense may create a gap between 
the de facto law and its realistic enforcement.164  While modifying 
the Indian anticorruption regime, Indian policy-makers should 
recognize this reality faced by individuals and businesses 
operating in India.  Recognizing this issue, India’s Chief Economic 
 
160 Business Registry for Int’l Bribery & Extortion (Bribeline) India Report, 2009, 
TRACE Int’l [hereinafter TRACE Report 2009] (covering a survey of ninety-six 
self-reports of demands for bribery in India between July 2007 and October 2008). 
161 See id. at 5 (stating that during the sixteen month period covered, bribe 
demands were predominantly for small dollar amounts and a vast majority were 
initiated by government officials).  See also Corruption in Trucking Operations in 
India, TRANSPARENCY INT’L INDIA (Feb. 2007), http://www.transparencyindia. 
org/resource/survey_study/Corruption%20in%20Trucking%20Operations%20in
%20India.pdf (“[T]ruckers pay bribes at every stage of their operations, which 
starts with getting registration and fitness certificates, and for issuance and 
renewal of interstate and national permits.”). 
162 Jason Burke & Manoj Kumar, India Corruption Protesters Dump Snakes in 
Busy Tax Office, GUARDIAN U.K., Nov. 30, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
world/2011/nov/30/india-corruption-protest-snakes-tax-office?newsfeed=true 
(describing the incident as an example of anticorruption protests occurring in 
northern India). 
163 See Kingshuk Nag, How IAS Officers Can Let Off Their Colleagues, Officially, 
TIMES OF INDIA BLOG (Mar. 20, 2012, 10:38 AM IST), 
http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/masala-noodles/entry/how-ias-
officers-can-let-off-their-colleagues-officially (expressing frustration at 
government officials’ ongoing manipulation of the anticorruption regime). 
164 Tripti Lahiri, Paid a Bribe in India?  Vent Here, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Nov. 15, 
2010, 10:13 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2010/11/15/paid-a-bribe-
in-india-vent-here/ (describing a website created on which individuals can report 
when a government official demands a bribe). 
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Advisor has argued that an individual who makes a “harassment 
bribe,” similar to a facilitation payment under the FCPA, should 
not be liable under the PCA because a public official may be 
deterred from soliciting these small bribes out of a concern that the 
individual could report the official to anticorruption authorities.165  
Additionally, facilitation payments for routine government actions 
only result in providing a service to which the bribe-giver is 
actually entitled.166  Furthermore, because facilitation payments are 
generally demanded by a government and not initiated by the 
private party, penalizing the official and not the private party may 
help to eliminate these payments.167   
India could take steps to ensure that a facilitation payment 
exception does not subsume the purpose of the PCA.  For instance, 
legislation could set a maximum amount for such payments.  India 
could consider adopting legislation or agency-issued rules that 
make disclosure mandatory or at least require companies to keep 
accounting records of such payments, like those required under the 
FCPA, as discussed in the next section. 
 
165 Kaushik Basu, Chief Economic Adviser, Ministry of Finance, Government 
of India, Why, for a Class of Bribes, the Act of Giving a Bribe Should Be Treated as Legal, 
at 3, 10 (Mar. 2011), http://www.kaushikbasu.org/Act_Giving_Bribe_Legal.pdf 
(suggesting that to discourage individuals from falsely accusing or blackmailing 
government officials, individuals who engage in such conduct should be 
penalized).  Basu argues that the amount paid in a harassment payment should be 
returned to its provider.  See id. at 7.  Basu also claims that even in the context of 
non-harassment payments, “the punishment meted out to the bribe taker should 
be substantially greater on the giver” so as to facilitate greater cooperation by the 
bribe-giver with an investigation and because the “primary moral responsibility . . 
. rests on the shoulder of the bribe taker.”  Id. at 8.  Both of these conclusions are 
ones that the author disagrees with.  Additionally, as Basu himself points out, 
many bribe-givers may be dissuaded from reporting demands for bribes because 
they will consider reputational costs of cooperating with officials on future 
business dealings with other government officials.  See id. at 9.  Infosys founder 
Narayana Murthy stated that Basu’s suggestions may dissuade government 
officials from demanding bribes, bribe-givers will likely remain hesitant to report 
government officials due to reputational concerns.  See Sagarika Ghose, Make 
Bribing Legal: Narayana Murthy, CNN-IBN, http://ibnlive.in.com/news/make-
bribe-giving-legal-narayana-murthy/169040-3.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2013) 
(describing how a businessperson may gain a reputation as a ‘squealer’ and 
shunned from future business transactions).  
166 See Phil Nichols, Who Allows Facilitating Payments?, 14 AGORA WITHOUT 
FRONTIERS 303, 307 (2009) (explaining that it may make sense to treat facilitation 
payments differently than other bribes because the former causes “degradation of 
the process” whereas the latter results in “the inducement of decisions that should 
not have been made.”). 
167 Basu, supra note 165, at 3 (claiming that immunizing bribe-givers will 
reduce bribery because it will encourage them to report bribe recipients). 
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4.  ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 
4.1.  The Accounting Requirements of the FCPA 
The FCPA requires covered corporations to maintain books 
and records that accurately and fairly reflect its transactions and to 
make corresponding annual reports.168  The FCPA also requires 
corporations to devise and maintain an adequate system of internal 
accounting controls intended to provide reasonable assurances that 
it maintains books and records in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting principles and which properly control and 
account for all corporate assets.169  Companies may also be 
required to report on total amounts paid to government officials.170  
Since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002,171 reports 
indicate the United States has begun to enforce the accounting and 
records offense more robustly.172  
 
168 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (reporting and record keeping obligations).  The 
accounting and reporting provisions apply only to companies with securities 
registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and foreign subsidiaries if 
the U.S. company holds more than fifty percent voting power.  See 15 U.S.C. § 
78m(b) (providing details on the form of the report and required information). 
169 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (reporting and record keeping obligations). 
170 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 1502, 
1504, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(2)(A) (2010) (requiring all U.S. and foreign companies 
registered with the SEC to report publicly how much they pay governments for 
the purpose of the commercial development of oil, natural gas, and minerals). 
171 The Act holds certain officers of certain companies personally 
“responsible for establishing and maintaining internal controls” which are 
“designed  . . . to ensure that material information relating to the company and its 
consolidated subsidiaries is made known.”  Public Company Accounting Reform 
and Investor Protection (“Sarbanes–Oxley”) Act § 302 (a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(4) 
(2002) (requiring the officers to evaluate “the effectiveness of the company’s 
internal controls as of a date within ninety days prior to the report.”).  See also id. § 
18 U.S.C. § 1350 (providing criminal penalties and/or a fine for a company’s 
CEO’s or CFO’s knowing or intentional certification of a financial statement that 
does not “fairly present[], in all material respects, the financial condition and 
results of operations of the issuer.”). 
172 See generally Joseph P. Covington et al, FCPA Enforcement in a Sarbanes-
Oxley World, 20 CORP. COUNS. (2005), available at 
http://jenner.com/system/assets/assets/1126/original/LJN_Corporate_Counsel
or_August2005.pdf?1317315365 (detailing an emphasis on corporate liability in a 
post- Sarbanes-Oxley environment); Matt A. Vega, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 
Culture of Bribery: Expanding the Scope of Private Whistleblower Suits to Overseas 
Employees, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 425, 444 (2009).  For violations of the books and 
records requirement, a criminal penalty can be imposed only when an individual 
knowingly circumvented, failed to implement, or falsified required records.  15 
U.S.C. § 78m(2)(b)(5).  For a critique of this requirement, see Joan T.A. Gabel et.  
al., Letter vs. Spirit: The Evolution of Compliance into Ethics, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 453, 454 
(2009) (“[T]he emphasis has fallen squarely on the letter-of-the-law compliance 
side of the equation by focusing on internal prevention and self-reporting, rather 
than spirit-of-the-law ethics.”). 
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 Additionally, the “SEC now impose[s] continuing reporting 
requirements of some kind as a condition of nearly all FCPA 
settlements.”173  The books and records requirements are unique 
requirements in an anticorruption statute considered important to 
the success of the FCPA.  According to an OECD review of the 
FCPA, accounting and reporting requirements are helpful in 
verifying companies’ compliance with internal anticorruption 
programs.174  The OECD also praised the new accounting 
standards in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the whistleblower 
provisions of the Dodd-Frank financial regulation reform law.175  
The United States has historically linked anticorruption efforts 
to proper accounting.  Prior to the passage of the FCPA, the United 
States penalized companies bribing foreign officials abroad under 
the Bank Secrecy Act, which required accurate reporting of funds 
brought in and out of the United States.176  In connection to this 
 
173 See Gibson Dunn, supra note 106, at 6. 
174 See OECD WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY IN INT’L BUS. TRANSACTIONS, REPORT 
ON THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN 
PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 2009 REVISED 
RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS (2010) (“Vigorous enforcement and record penalties, alongside 
increased private sector engagement, has encouraged the establishment of robust 
compliance program[]s and measures, particularly in large companies, which are 
verified by the accounting and auditing profession and monitored by senior 
management.”). 
175  OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY 
CONVENTION IN THE UNITED STATES ¶ 107 (2010), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/corruption/anti-bribery/anti-
briberyconvention/UnitedStatesphase3reportEN.pdf (noting that “heightened 
concern” captured in Sarbanes-Oxley requires issuers to evaluate the sufficiency 
of controls during past years which “has had a very positive impact on . . . 
corporate controls . . . and thereby the prevention and detection of foreign 
bribery”).  The Dodd-Frank Act provides whistleblowers with a percentage of any 
penalties assessed in connection with resulting FCPA cases involving public 
companies in cases where enforcement actions include monetary sanctions 
collected above $1 million and a whistleblower has made a qualifying report to 
the SEC.  See generally Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protection, 15 
U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2010); SEC Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of § 
21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–10 (2011) (issuing a 
final rule implementing those provisions of the SEC).  Some critics have noted that 
this may result in a poor incentive structure whereby employees are prematurely 
encouraged to report companies rather than giving companies the opportunity to 
self-correct.  See, e.g., Interview with Mark Mendelsohn, Former Director DOJ 
Foreign Bribery Unit (Sept. 10, 2010), printed in On the Rise of FCPA Enforcement, 
24 CORP. CRIME REP. 35, available at http://www.corporatecrimereporter. 
com/mendelsohn091010.htm (providing a summary of Mendelsohn’s remarks). 
176 Daniel Pines, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Include a Private 
Right of Action, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 185, 188 (1994).  See also The Financial 
Recordkeeping and Reporting of Currency and Foreign Transactions Act of 1970, 
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statute, in 1974, the SEC adopted an amnesty-like approach 
through a “voluntary disclosure program” that allowed issuers to 
self-investigate illegal foreign payments, adopt a policy of stopping 
these payments, and file a corresponding report with the SEC or 
suffer harsher penalties later.177  This voluntary disclosure program 
helped the United States to discover widespread slush funds and 
helped encourage the passage of the FCPA.178  Additionally, 
although the Bribery Act does not impose accounting 
requirements, there are a number of substantively similar 
accounting and reporting requirements under U.K. law.179 
Indications from other countries also support the effectiveness 
of strict accounting requirements as part of anticorruption efforts.  
One recent study examining Chinese firms’ entertainment and 
travel costs concluded that firms with stricter internal auditing 
rules spend less money bribing government officials.180  
Additionally, booking and accounting requirements offer 
evidentiary benefits.  According to one scholar, the accounting and 
internal controls provisions are “one of the most effective weapons 
regulators possess in enforcing the FCPA,” making it “much easier 
for regulators to prove their case.”181 
 
31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–30 (2006); Notice of Plea and Plea Agreement, United States v. 
Textron, Inc., No. 07-CV-01505 (D.D.C. July 10, 1979). 
177 Kathleen A. Lacey et al., Assessing the Deterrent Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act’s Certification Provisions: A Comparative Analysis Using the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 397, 416 (2005).  See also Senate Comm. on 
Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., Rep. of the SEC on Questionable 
and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices 6–7 (Comm. Print 1976) (discussing 
the voluntary disclosure program). 
178 See generally Lacey, supra note 177, at 416–17. 
179 See generally Companies Act, 1985, § 221 (Eng.) (“Every company shall 
[keep] . . . accounting records . . . [that] . . . shall be sufficient to show and explain 
the company’s transactions.”).  For example, BAE entered into a plea agreement in 
which it admitted that it failed to keep adequate accounting records, in violation 
of Section 221, concerning the company’s 2002 sale of military technology to 
Tanzania.  See Settlement Agreement Between the Serious Fraud Office and BAE 
Systems PLC, Feb. 2010, http://www.sfo.gov.uk/media/133535/bae%20-
%20settlement%20agreement%20and%20basis%20of%20plea.pdf. 
180 Yuhua Wang, Who Bribes Authoritarian Rulers and Why?  Evidence From 
China, (University of Pennsylvania Department of Political Science, Working 
Paper) (on file with author). 
181 Thomas F. McInerney, The Regulation of Bribery in the United States, 73 
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PÉNAL 81, 87–88 (2002). 
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4.2.  The Benefits of Instituting Accounting Requirements as a part of 
Indian Anticorruption Efforts 
Under current Indian law, the Companies Act requires 
companies to keep accounting records that provide a “true and fair 
view” of the financial status of the company and detail its 
transactions.182  Nonetheless, these accounting requirements are 
entirely separate from any provision in Indian law pertaining to 
corruption and are not subject to CBI enforcement or enforcement 
by the proposed ombudsman body if the Lokpal Bill should pass.  
Additionally, because the PCA authorizes the government to 
appoint special judges for corruption cases, these accounting 
requirements may be enforced in courts separately from corruption 
offenses.183  In fact, Indian law explicitly provides that “even 
correct and authentic entries in books of account cannot without 
independent evidence of their trustworthiness, fix a liability upon 
a person.”184  In a case alleging abetment of a PCA offense against 
private parties in which the defendants’ accounting records 
reflected bribe payments, the Indian Supreme Court specifically 
concluded that accounting books were insufficient evidence to 
charge an abettor with liability under the PCA where CBI did not 
charge the officials with violating the PCA.185 
If India adopted accounting procedures as part of its 
anticorruption efforts, it could facilitate transparency, improve the 
effectiveness of anticorruption legislation, and facilitate the 
effectiveness of private sector compliance programs.  Introducing 
accounting requirements as part of an Indian anticorruption 
 
182 The Companies Act, 1956, No. 1 of 1956, INDIA CODE (1993), vol. 2 § 209 
(1), (3)(a), available at http://indiacode.nic.in (requiring companies to keep 
“proper books of account” reflecting funds received and expended, sales and 
purchases of goods, and all assets and liabilities of a company that provide a “true 
and fair view of the state of affairs of the company”).  The Company Act provides 
that certain company officers may be imprisoned or fined for violating the 
offense.  See generally id. § 209 (5), (6). 
183 See PCA § 3.  Although the PCA does permit an officer conducting a 
corruption investigation to inspect banking records where they relate to a person 
under investigation for violating the PCA.  See id. § 18. 
184 Central Bureau of Investigation v. V.C. Shukla, A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 1406, ¶ 44 
(India).  See also Indian Evidence Act, 1872, No. 1 of 1872, § 34 as amended by the 
Act 21 of 2000, § 92 and Schedule II (stating that records “regularly kept in the 
course of business, are relevant whenever they refer to a matter into which the 
court has to inquire” but such records “shall not alone be sufficient evidence to 
charge any person with liability”). 
185 V.C. Shukla, 1998 S.C. 1406 ¶ 55–58 (India) (holding that prosecutors 
could not use accounting books to show the defendants aided in the commission 
of a PCA offense). 
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regime may help ensure that businesses carefully record any 
facilitation or harassment payments.  Stringent accounting 
requirements combined with a defense for facilitation payments 
will also encourage companies to report costs, including facilitation 
payments, truthfully and will facilitate the monitoring of these 
facilitation payments while preventing abuse of this exception.  For 
example, a company can only avail itself of the FCPA exception if 
it clearly documents facilitation payments to ensure that the 
payments qualify for the exception.186  Moreover, accounting 
requirements provide a relatively objective mechanism by which a 
country can monitor corruption without using inspectors who 
themselves may be prone to corruption.187 
Accounting and booking requirements also link anticorruption 
efforts to other challenges faced in India such as tax evasion and 
asset recovery.188  Under the current regime in India, asset recovery 
is only possible where a defendant is convicted of criminal 
charges.189  The Supreme Court of India has expressed concern for 
the existing limitations on asset recovery.190  Additionally, 
 
186 See Pal & Parkinson, supra note 109, at 8. 
187 See, e.g., Hongbin Cai et al., Eat, Drink, Firms, Government: An Investigation 
of Corruption from Entertainment and Travel Costs of Chinese Firms, 54 J. L & ECON. 55, 
56 (2011) (using accounting books of Chinese firms to study unusually high 
expenses in entertainment and travel costs of Chinese firms).  See also Benjamin 
Olken, Corruption and the Costs of Redistribution: Micro Evidence from Indonesia, 90 J. 
PUBLIC ECON 853 (2006) (using various objective measures, such as the quantity of 
public grants to schools, to measure corruption in Indonesia); Marianne Bertrand, 
et al., Obtaining a Driving License in India: An Experimental Approach to Studying 
Corruption, 122 Q. J. ECON. 1639 (2007) (using “detailed survey data and 
experimental evidence” to study corruption in India). 
188 The Washington D.C.-based Global Financial Integrity estimates that only 
27.8 percent of India’s illicit assets are held domestically indicating “the desire to 
amass wealth illegally without attracting government attention.”  The 
organization estimated that between 1948 and 2008 India lost a total of $213 
billion in illicit financial flows.  See Dev Kar, The Drivers and Dynamics of Illicit 
Financial Flows from India: 1948–2008, GLOBAL FIN. INTEGRITY, (2010), 
http://www.gfintegrity.org/ 
storage/gfip/documents/reports/india/gfi_india.pdf.  The report also noted that 
corruption is one of the main drivers of illicit cash flows.  See id. at 1, 51. 
189 The PCA provides for confiscation and forfeiture of the assets of a public 
servant or the proceeds of corruption only after the public servant is convicted of 
the relevant offense under the PCA. 
190 See Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Co., A.I.R. 1996 
S.C. 2005 (India).  The Supreme Court explained, “[A] law providing for forfeiture 
of properties acquired by holders of ‘public office’ . . . by indulging in corrupt and 
illegal acts and deals, is a crying necessity in the present state of our society.”  Id. 
¶ 31.  Although noting that it was up to the Parliament to act on the issue, the 
Court called such a law “an absolute necessity, if the canker of corruption is not to 
prove the death knell of this nation.”  Id. 
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adopting accounting requirements will aid India’s compliance with 
the U.N. Convention Against Corruption’s emphasis on asset 
recovery and proper records as a major element of anticorruption 
efforts.191  Moreover, the U.N. Convention requires states to 
disallow the tax deductibility of expenses that constitute bribes, a 
step facilitated by clear and specific records.192 
5.  ENFORCEMENT AND RESOLUTION OF VIOLATIONS 
5.1.   Resolution and Settlement of FCPA Violations 
Various characteristics of FCPA enforcement have been 
particularly useful to its successes in balancing criminal 
enforcement with voluntary business compliance.  Two U.S. 
agencies are responsible for enforcing the FCPA—the SEC can 
pursue civil penalties and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) can 
pursue both civil and criminal penalties.193  The agencies can, and 
often do, bring parallel enforcement actions. 
Although the FCPA provides for both civil and/or criminal 
penalties, in reality, extra-judicial mechanisms are the U.S. 
government’s primary means of enforcing the FCPA.  For example, 
parties may seek advisory opinions to ensure their behavior 
complies with the FCPA.194  These procedures enable covered 
parties “to obtain an opinion of the Attorney General as to whether 
certain specified, prospective—not hypothetical—conduct 
conforms with the Department’s present enforcement policy 
regarding the anti-bribery provisions” of the FCPA.195  This allows 
 
191 See generally U.N. Convention Against Corruption, art. 12 (2)(f) (“Ensuring 
that private enterprises . . . have sufficient internal auditing controls to assist in 
preventing and detecting acts of corruption and that the accounts and required 
financial statements . . .  are subject to appropriate auditing and certification 
procedures.”); id. at art. 51 (stating that asset recovery is a “fundamental 
principle” of the Convention). 
192 Id. at art. 12(4).  The Convention requires parties to take actions to prevent 
the establishment of off-record accounts, inadequately identified transactions, and 
intentional destruction of bookkeeping documents.  See also id. at art. 12(3). 
193 The agencies appear to bring roughly the same number of prosecutions 
each year although in some years, the DOJ has brought more prosecutions.  See 
Gibson Dunn, supra note 106, at 2 (providing a graphic display of the agency’s 
enforcement actions). 
194 See 28 C.F.R. 80.  The DOJ describes these opinion procedures on its 
website: http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/ (last visited 
Nov. 23, 2011).  Copies of previously issued opinions are also available on this 
site. 
195 28 C.F.R. § 80.1.  The FCPA directed the U.S. Attorney General to 
“establish a procedure to provide responses to specific inquiries by issuers 
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firms and individuals to work closely with government officials to 
ensure compliance with FCPA requirements by obtaining official 
advice on the legality of specific behavior.  As the U.S. Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines provide, “employees and agents may report 
or seek guidance regarding potential or actual criminal conduct 
without fear of retaliation.”196  
The DOJ has historically preferred settlement procedures as a 
way of resolving alleged FCPA violations such that FCPA litigation 
is extremely uncommon.197  Since the FCPA came into law, the U.S. 
government has enforced the statute with an underlying notion 
that “[t]he most efficient means of implementing the [FCPA] is 
voluntary compliance by the American business community.”198  
For example, a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) is a tool 
used by the DOJ and the SEC in which the prosecutor agrees with 
the company to hold off on prosecuting the illegal activity while 
the company revises its practices.199  Such agreements generally 
include payment of restitution to victims, cooperation with a 
government investigation, and implementation of remedial 
controls and a compliance program intended to help prevent 
future violations.200  If the company abides by the agreement, DOJ 
may in exchange dismiss the case.201  The DOJ may also permit 
 
concerning conformance of their conduct with the [DOJ]’s present enforcement 
policy . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(d)(1).  
196 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, supra note 148, pt. b(5)(c).  
Additionally, courts may consider efforts to comply with DOJ advisory opinions 
in the event of judicial resolution of any future violations.  See id. at pt. b(5)(c) 
(providing that compliance efforts should be considered during sentencing in 
FCPA related offenses). 
197 See Shearman & Sterling FCPA DIGEST, supra note 147, at xiii (“Litigation is 
rare in FCPA enforcement actions . . . .”) 
198 Heyman, supra note 10, at 6 (asserting that while adopting an anti-bribery 
policy would not insulate a company from investigation or prosecution where 
“serious controls are lacking,” a good faith effort to monitor for violations would 
affect DOJ policy towards that company).  For a general discussion of the 
importance of voluntary business compliance in enforcing the FCPA, see 
generally, Philip Urofsky et al., How Should We Measure the Effectiveness of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act?  Don’t Break What Isn’t Broken—The Fallacies of 
Reform, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1145 (2012). 
199 FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 105, at 74. 
200 Id. 
201 Under the terms of one DPA, a company agreed to implement enhanced 
compliance policies and procedures, engage an independent corporate monitor, 
and cooperate with the investigation through voluntary disclosure and review of 
its improper payments.  In exchange, the DOJ agreed to defer prosecution for 
three years and to dismiss the criminal information if the company abided by the 
terms of the agreement.  See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States 
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parties to enter into non-prosecution agreements (NPA)202 and plea 
bargains as a way of efficiently resolving FCPA allegations.203 
The SEC has followed the DOJ’s direction in favoring 
settlements and entered into its first DPA in May 2011.204  The SEC 
also uses a number of non-criminal enforcement mechanisms 
including fines, disgorgement of illegally obtained gains, pre-
judgment interest, non-prosecution agreements, and an injunction 
or cease and desist order prohibiting current and future 
violations.205  In 2010, the SEC established a new FCPA unit 
specifically tasked with devising methods of more proactive FCPA 
enforcement.206 
Settlements are a forward-looking solution because they 
encourage private sector cooperation.  These settlements offer a 
way of “winding down . . . dodgy deals” and restructuring 
company practices to improve transparency and accountability.207  
 
v. AGA Med. Corp., No. 08-CR-172-JMR (D. Minn. June 3, 2008) (resolving an 
investigation of alleged improper payments to Chinese officials). 
202 See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 105, at 75 (defining a non-
prosecution agreement as one in which the DOJ “maintains the right to file 
charges but refrains from doing so to allow the company to demonstrate its good 
conduct,” but unlike a DPA, the agreement is not filed with a court). 
203 See, e.g., Press Release, DOJ, Subsidiary of Tyco International Ltd. Pleads 
Guilty, Is Sentenced for Conspiracy to Violate Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Sept. 
24, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/September/12-crm-1149.html 
(reporting on a plea bargain in which Tyco International Ltd. and a subsidiary 
pleaded guilty to bribing officials and agreed to pay more than $26M to resolve 
charges brought by the SEC and DOJ that the parties falsified books and records 
and made illegal payments to government officials). 
204 See Christopher R. Conte & Lucinda A. Low, Racing to a Locked Door?  SEC 
Issues Final Whistleblower Bounty Rule and Announces First Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement, Revealing Competing Incentives for Corporate Self Reporting, STEPTOE & 
JOHNSON LLP (June 7, 2011), http://www.steptoe.com/publications-newsletter-
206.html (involving allegations that a company bribed Uzbek government officials 
in connection with a bid to supply oil and gas pipelines in which the company 
agreed to pay $5.4M in disgorgement and prejudgment interest to the SEC).  The 
SEC agreement was paired with a $3.5M criminal penalty and non-prosecution 
agreement with the DOJ.  Id.  See generally Philip Urofsky et al, A New Tool and a 
Twist? The SEC’s First Deferred Prosecution Agreement and a Novel Punitive Measure, 
SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP (May 24, 2011), http://www.shearman.com/a-new-
tool-and-a-twist--the-secs-first-deferred-prosecution-agreement-and-a-novel-
punitive-measure-05-24-2011/. 
205 See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 105, at 76–77. 
206 See Press Release, SEC, SEC Names New Specialized Unit Chiefs and 
Head of New Office of Market Intelligence (Jan. 13, 2010), http://www.sec.gov 
/news/press/2010/2010-5.htm. 
207 Eric Engle, I Get by with a Little Help from My Friends? Understanding the 
U.K. Anti-Bribery Statute, by Reference to the OECD Convention and the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, 44 INT’L LAW. 1173, 1174 (2010) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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Before either the DOJ or the SEC agrees to a settlement, each 
agency conducts a broader investigation over a defending 
company’s operations—this practice can potentially create ongoing 
cooperative effort between investigators and companies.208  
Furthermore, DPAs, plea bargains, and other cooperative 
agreements help the United States to preserve scarce prosecutorial 
resources and to prevent disruption of commerce. 
Nonetheless, the FCPA “settlement regime” is not without its 
critics.  The emphasis on settlement agreements provides FCPA 
enforcers with substantial discretion and a relative lack of judicial 
oversight.  As one article remarks, “Bribery cases against 
companies settle.  That’s a fact.  If you want to know where the line 
between legitimate business expense and bribe falls, good luck 
finding it.”209  Although courts must approve settlement 
agreements, there are indications that judicial oversight over such 
procedures is limited.210  Additionally, the use of settlements may 
contribute to a lack of case law to interpret FCPA.   
In response to private sector concerns that prohibitions of the 
FCPA and their enforcement are vague, the DOJ and the SEC 
recently released guidelines that they suggest will alleviate these 
concerns.211  It is too soon to tell whether these guidelines will or 
will not help establish clearer rules.  Additionally, in recent years, 
the DOJ began to provide copies of all settlement agreements on its 
website, a move that may resolve some concerns pertaining to 
 
208 In its last audit of U.S. anticorruption practices, the OECD praised U.S. 
enforcement of the FCPA but noted some criticism that the U.S. may not 
adequately consider private sector views in determining enforcement policy.  
Nonetheless, the OECD acknowledged that settlement agreements and a refrain 
from criminal prosecution indicate considerable coordination by U.S. government 
agencies with the private sector.  See Samuel Rubenfeld, OECD Praises US Anti-
Bribery Enforcement, Recommends More Private Sector Input, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Oct. 
20, 2010, 11:16 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2010/10/20/ 
oecd-praises-us-anti-bribery-enforcement-recommends-more-private-sector-
input/. 
209 Joe Palazzolo, New FCPA Guidance…Coming Right Up!, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG 
(Nov. 8, 2011, 4:44 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/11/08/new-fcpa-
guidance-coming-right-up/. 
210 See, e.g., Shearman & Sterling, supra note 197, at xiii (noting a concern that 
the SEC’s use of deferred prosecution agreements will shield SEC enforcement 
actions from judicial scrutiny). 
211 See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 105; see also Breuer Speech, supra 
note 7 (explaining the government’s intention for the guide is to serve as “a useful 
and transparent aid”).   
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transparency and consistency.212  Moreover, the large number of 
open FCPA cases resulting from voluntary disclosures by 
companies demonstrates that despite some complaints from the 
business community relating to the FCPA, the relationship 
between U.S. enforcers and the business community is somewhat 
cooperative.213 
Although settlements are used to resolve a majority of cases, a 
survey of FCPA cases between 2005 and 2011 suggested that FCPA 
cases are most likely to result in criminal charges where a 
defendant had knowledge of or who was involved with the bribe 
scheme and if the amounts were relatively large.214  Although the 
United States embraces vicarious liability of a company and its 
officers for behavior of its employees and agents, the survey 
suggests that cases are most often actively pursued only against 
individual corporate affiliates “who either suspected impropriety 
but failed to investigate or in the worst cases, knew and actually 
actively participated in the misconduct.”215 
5.2.   Resolution and Settlement of Bribery Act Violations 
Although the Bribery Act is too recent to evaluate how British 
authorities will enforce it, various guidance reports provide some 
indication.  There are two U.K. agencies involved in enforcing the 
Bribery Act: the Serious Fraud Office (SFO)216 and the U.K. 
 
212 U.S. GOv’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-110, DOJ HAS TAKEN STEPS TO 
BETTER TRACK ITS USE OF DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS, BUT 
SHOULD EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS (2009) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
213 But see Stephen J. Choi & Kevin E. Davis, Foreign Affairs and Enforcement of 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (NYU Sch. Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory 
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 12-35, Law & Econ. Research Paper 
Series, Working Paper No. 12-15, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2116487 (finding no evidence that voluntary disclosure of 
FCPA violations resulted in lesser penalties). 
214 M. Scott Peeler, A Study of Individual Liability Under the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act: A Review of Government-Filed Civil and Criminal FCPA Cases Against 
Individuals, CHADBOURNE COMPLIANCE Q. SPECIAL REP. (Chadbourne & Park LLP, 
New York, N.Y.), Oct. 2011, at 4, http://www.usubc.org/site/files/ 
Compliance_Quarterly_Special_Report_2011.pdf. 
215 Id. at 1–2 (surveying sixty-one individuals charged criminally or civilly 
charged with violating the FCPA—fifty-three of whom were senior corporate 
officials or owners, and eight of whom were not directly involved with the alleged 
corrupt act but were third-party agents).  Only two cases involved indirect 
knowledge, where the defendant was not directly told of the offensive conduct, 
but evidence indicated that he/she was aware of circumstances that would lead a 
reasonable person to suspect impropriety, and the government only sought civil 
charges in those cases.  See id. at 4–5. 
216 See What We Do and Who We Work With, SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE, 
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-do-and-who-we-work-with.aspx 
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Ministry of Justice.  The offices issued guidance reports “to set out 
the Directors’ approach to prosecutorial decision-making in respect 
of offences under the Act.”217  That guidance indicates that U.K. 
enforcement authorities plan to enforce the statute so as “to 
balance corporate responsibility for ensuring ethical conduct in the 
modern international business environment with the public 
interest in prosecuting where appropriate.”218 
There are also indications that the United Kingdom will rely on 
alternative enforcement procedures such as deferred prosecution 
agreements the way the DOJ and the SEC have in enforcing the 
FCPA.  During 2012, the U.K. Ministry of Justice announced that it 
would introduce DPA agreements in England and Wales through 
legislation that is currently pending in the British Parliament.219  In 
implementing the Bribery Act, Scotland has instituted an amnesty 
program under which parties can, within twenty-four months of 
the act’s implementation, self-report violations in exchange for 
criminal amnesty.220 
Additionally, prior to the enactment of the Bribery Act, the 
United Kingdom seemed to be moving towards settlement 
agreements as a method to resolve anticorruption allegations.  For 
example, in July 2009, the SFO issued guidance encouraging 
companies dealing with overseas corruption to self-report in 
exchange for receiving a plea bargain settlement and avoiding a 
criminal penalty.221  Also in 2009, the U.K. Financial Services 
 
(last visited Apr. 12, 2013) (announcing the SFO as the U.K. government agency 
specifically tasked with “reducing fraud and corruption” and “maintaining 
confidence in the UK’s business and financial institutions”). 
217 SFO Bribery Act Guidance, supra note 139, at 2.   
218 Id. at 3. 
219 See Gibson Dunn, supra note 106, at 23 (describing Schedule 16 of the 
Crime and Courts Bill, which includes a provision calling for the Ministry of Justice 
to issue procedural guidance on DPAs). 
220 See Gibson Dunn, supra note 106, at 24.  Already, one Scottish case 
involves a £5.6M civil recovery against a drilling company after it “admitted that 
it had benefited from corrupt payments made in connection with a contract 
entered into by one of its overseas subsidiaries and an overseas oil and gas 
company.”  Id. at 22.  See also Stephen A. Fraser, Placing the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act on the Tracks in the Race for Amnesty, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1009, 1010–11 
(2012), available at http://www.texaslrev.com/90-texas-l-rev-1009/ (proposing a 
similar amnesty program for the United States). 
221 See John P. Rupp et al, Voluntary Disclosure and the Problems of Plea 
Bargaining in SERIOUS ECONOMIC CRIME 162, 163 (2011), available at http:// 
www.seriouseconomiccrime.com/ebooks/Serious-Economic-Crime.pdf.  
Nevertheless, it is questionable whether the SFO has the authority to pursue such 
agreements.  See id. (“The difficulty for the SFO is that it does not currently have 
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Authority (FSA) agreed to reduce a fine by thirty percent for a 
company that made suspicious payments to businesses and 
individuals in foreign countries but cooperated with the 
investigation.222  In 2008, the FSA settled a case involving bribery 
allegations in a contract to recreate the Alexandria Library in Egypt 
while claiming that the settlement allowed the SFO to penalize the 
company while “avoiding the extensive cost to the public purse of 
lengthy court proceedings.”223   
What is common to both FCPA and Bribery Act enforcement is 
a balance between criminal enforcement, civil fines, and alternative 
settlement procedures, such as deferred prosecution agreements, 
designed to encourage business cooperation.  Nonetheless, both 
U.S. and U.K. authorities have embraced criminal penalties when 
necessary.  These multiple avenues of enforcement help avoid 
over-criminalization and ensure a working relationship with 
businesses. 
5.3.   Recommendations for Enforcement Mechanisms and Settlement 
Procedures in India 
India would benefit from embracing alternative prosecution 
methods to avoid over-criminalization and encourage useful 
coordination with the private sector.  Under the PCA, criminal 
charges and fines are the dominant means of enforcing 
anticorruption laws.  Nonetheless, criminal charges impose various 
externalities and potentially significant consequences on third 
parties and individuals involved with a company, including 
employees and shareholders, who did not engage in the violating 
behavior.  In some instances, enforcing authorities may determine 
that the severe consequences of criminal prosecution are not worth 
the costs such prosecution might impose.  In supporting the use of 
non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements, the DOJ 
has stated that such tools reflect the idea that the “collateral 
consequences” of white-collar crime prosecutions “may be 
unjustified where a corporation fully cooperates with the 
 
the statutory power to impose fines or to enter into a [deferred prosecution] 
arrangement.”) 
222 Michael Peel & Andrea Felsted, Insurers Face Bribery Crackdown After 
£5.25M Aon Fine, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 8 2009, 8:45 PM), http://www.ft.com/ 
cms/s/0/73159894-ddc4-11dd-87dc-000077b07658.html#axzz1bkKemrTk. 
223 David Leigh & Rob Evans, Balfour Beatty Agrees to Pay £2.25M Over 
Allegations of Bribery In Egypt, GUARDIAN, Oct. 6, 2008, at 28, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/oct/07/balfourbeatty.egypt. 
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government’s investigation, appropriately disciplines culpable 
individuals,” and makes restitution to victims.224 
Additionally, there are various indications that alternative 
settlement procedures enhance the effectiveness of U.S. 
anticorruption efforts.  Concerning non-prosecution and deferred 
prosecution agreements, the OECD has stated that it is “quite clear 
that the use of these agreements is one of the reasons for the 
impressive FCPA enforcement record in the U.S.”225  DOJ advisory 
opinion procedures also encourage private sector cooperation.  As 
such, the impetus behind this procedure is similar to the idea 
behind current PCA provisions that prevent the use of statements 
of a bribe-giver against a corrupt public official in an enforcement 
action against the bribe-giver.226  Yet unlike the current PCA 
provisions, statements given in conjunction with the DOJ’s 
formalized opinion procedures discourage future bribery because 
they eliminate a potential defense that a company or individual 
believed certain violating behavior to be legal. 
Civil enforcement and alternative prosecution agreements also 
have the benefit of providing a diverse set of enforcers.  The 
activist supported Lokpal Bill has become popular on a platform 
critical of CBI’s lack of independence and supportive of a public 
role in anticorruption efforts.  Alternative enforcement procedures 
through multiple agencies, like FCPA enforcement through DOJ 
and SEC actions, helps create multiple avenues of anticorruption 
enforcement and helps facilitate an ongoing monitoring 
relationship with businesses.  One question that follows the 
suggestions of this Comment will be the role of the judiciary in 
reviewing such agreements.227  Nonetheless, because settlement 
 
224 Letter from Edward N. Siskel, Assoc. Deputy Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to Eileen Larence, Dir. of Homeland Sec. & Justice, U.S. Gov’t 
Accountability Office (Dec. 15, 2009), in GAO REPORT, supra note 212, at 37. 
225 PHASE 3, supra note 174, ¶ 54 (noting that not all the deterrent effects of 
settlement agreements have been quantified). 
226 PCA § 24 (“[A] statement made by a person in any proceeding against a 
public servant . . . that he offered or agreed to offer any gratification (other than 
legal remuneration) or any valuable thing to the public servant, shall not subject 
such person to a prosecution under section 12.”).  But see Bhupinder Singh Patel v. 
Central Bureau of Investigation, (2008) 2008 Crim. L.J. (Delhi H.C.) 4396 (May 30, 
2008) (holding that this exemption is only applicable where the bribe-giver 
establishes that he/she gave the bribe unwillingly and only to help gain evidence 
against the public employee). 
227 In the United States, the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, allows judges 
to approve deferred prosecution agreements pursuant to a written agreement 
between the government and a defendant, although government reports indicate 
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agreements need not require extensive judicial intervention, 
settlement mechanisms may also help deal with resource 
restrictions in India’s courts and prevent corruption cases from 
becoming stuck in the backlog in Indian courts.  Alternative 
prosecution agreements may also decrease concentrations of power 
by moving corruption enforcement away from the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the judiciary by permitting extra-judicial 
enforcement as well.228  Indian enforcement authorities could use 
settlement agreements to facilitate asset recovery from public 
officials and impose fines from bribing private parties, even 
without bringing criminal charges.  Under current or proposed 
Indian law, there is no law allowing for non-conviction based 
forfeiture, of the sort under FCPA non-prosecution or deferred 
prosecution agreements. 
Using settlement agreements to enforce anticorruption regimes 
creates risks as well.  There is some concern that the availability of 
such agreements will result in the government bringing more cases 
than it would otherwise, including cases in which it would likely 
be unable to prove a violation of the law.229  Settlement agreements 
also pose a concern that an entire area of law may develop with a 
lack of judicial review because such review over settlement 
agreements is limited.  Like the United States and the United 
Kingdom, India is a common law country, and it will suffer from 
any detriment to the development of an FCPA judicial body of law 
resulting from the use of settlements.  Relying on ideas similar to 
those that support an independent Lokpal body, India might 
address this concern by establishing some sort of independent 
oversight body that would approve of cases.  Alternatively, Indian 
courts may play a more active oversight role over settlement 
agreements than U.S. courts play in FCPA enforcement.  In fact, 
there are indications that U.K. enforcement authorities intend to 
address shortcomings of DPA and other settlement agreements by 
 
that neither government nor private parties find judicial review in this context to 
be particularly useful.  GAO REPORT, supra note 212, at 25–28. 
228 The Indian judiciary has also been subject to a number of corruption-
related criticisms.  A 2005 study of the lower judiciary (excluding judges of the 
Supreme Court and state High Courts) covered 14,405 rural respondents spread 
across twenty Indian states and found that forty-seven percent of respondents had 
direct experience with bribing the judiciary and eighty-one percent believed the 
judiciary was corrupt.  See India Corruption Study 2005, supra note 22, at 6. 
229 A former director of the DOJ’s FCPA unit admitted, “[I]f the Department 
only had the option of bringing a criminal case or declining to bring a case, you 
would certainly bring fewer cases.”  Mike Koehler, Report Cards, FCPAPROFESSOR, 
June 30, 2011, http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2011/06/report-cards.html. 
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adopting more judicial oversight.230  Additionally, Indian 
enforcement authorities may consider tracking implementation of 
settlement agreements through some sort of performance 
measures.231 
5.4.  Facilitating Coordination of India’s Anticorruption Efforts with 
Foreign and International Efforts 
A robust domestic anticorruption program will complement 
enforcement of the FCPA and Bribery Act, as well as other foreign 
statutes, in India.  Additionally, if India effectively enforces its 
anticorruption regime against parties otherwise covered by these 
foreign statutes,232 foreign governments may choose to forego 
enforcement, mitigating some of the concerns pertaining to the 
extraterritoriality of the FCPA and Bribery Act.233 
 
230 See Attorney Gen. for Eng. & Wales Dominic Grieve, Address before the 
Cambridge International Symposium on Economic Crime: Responsibility for Risk: 
Staying on the Right Side of the Law (Sept. 5, 2011), https://www.gov.uk/ 
government/speeches/current-government-policy-on-economic-crime (“A crucial 
question for any comparable UK process would be the degree of judicial oversight 
and the mechanism for achieving that.  However, if the UK can learn from the US 
experience and avoid some of the pitfalls the Americans have encountered then 
deferred prosecution agreements may offer a new way for the UK to deal with 
corporate crime in appropriate cases.”). 
231 The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) evaluated NPA and 
DPA agreements and concluded that the DOJ should use measurable performance 
indicators to determine their effectiveness.  For example, the agency suggested 
that one measure could be whether the company repeats the criminal behavior 
after its agreement or whether the company successfully implements the terms of 
the agreement.  See generally GAO REPORT, supra note 212. 
232 For example, the FCPA also covers Indian companies listing shares on 
U.S. exchanges, even if the conduct has no territorial nexus to the United States.  
See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2013) (prohibiting any issuer who registers U.S. 
securities from bribing any foreign official).  
233 See Steven R. Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to Global 
Harmony, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 419, 433 (1999) (claiming that the extraterritorial 
reach of the FCPA is an “undeniable source of transnational tension and strife” 
that risks “[p]otential host country resentment of extraterritorially applied 
legislation”).  This risk may be even greater if the Bribery Act is enforced up to its 
limits of those “closely connected” to the United Kingdom, a jurisdiction likely 
broader than that of the FCPA.  There is some debate over the effects of foreign-
looking statutes such as the FCPA and the Bribery Act on developing economies.  
Compare Andrew Brady Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding Anti-Bribery 
Legislation as Economic Sanctions Against Emerging Markets, 62 FLA. L. REV. 351, 371–
74 (2010) (arguing that measures meant to deter bribery abroad also deter foreign 
investment), and Philip Segal, Coming Clean on Dirty Dealing: Time for a Fact-Based 
Evaluation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 18 FLA. J. INT’L L. 169, 172 (2006) 
(“[B]ribery of public officials abroad is, for the most part, harmful to the citizens of 
the particular country.  The literature on corruption appears to have defeated the 
notion that bribery is efficient or desirable, and regime change in certain corrupt 
countries has helped debunk that myth as well.”). 
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There have been a number of FCPA enforcement actions for 
bribery of both state and national government officials in India.234  
Additionally, there have been a number of instances where 
companies have publicly announced internal investigations 
relating to potential FCPA violations in India.235  Lastly, both 
American and/or British prosecutors may charge certain Indian 
companies for violations of the FCPA or the Bribery Act, 
respectively, where those companies meet certain jurisdictional 
requirements under those statutes. 
To be effective, India’s war against corruption must also rely on 
domestic legislation to dissuade multinational and domestic 
businesses from using bribery as a means of conducting business.  
Noting that foreign-reaching statutes such as the FCPA and the 
Bribery Act represent “a welcome development that can 
complement and reward efforts within host countries, especially to 
combat grand corruption by multinational businesses,” Susan 
Rose-Ackerman stressed the need for domestic legislation.236  
Ackerman opined that these international measures hold “little 
real bite as hard law,” because “these effects can only complement, 
not substitute for, domestic reform.”237 
Coordination between government bodies enforcing the 
Bribery Act, the FCPA, and other foreign statutes will continue to 
ensure that India is not alone in combating the supply of 
corruption in India.238  For instance, the OECD Anti-Bribery 
 
234 See Rina Pal & James Parkinson, supra note 109, at 5 (describing a number 
of FCPA enforcement actions involving government officials in India); Paula 
Anderson, Indian Bribery & Corruption Exposed, INT’L FINANCIAL L. REV., Apr. 24, 
2013, http://www.iflr.com/Article/3196287/Indian-bribery-and-corruption-
exposed.html (same).  
235 See id. at 5 (“[A] number of companies have publicly announced 
investigations involving improper payments in India obtained during an 
acquisition”). 
236 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption: Greed, Culture, and the State, 120 YALE 
L.J. ONLINE 125, 139 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/11/10/rose-
ackerman.html. 
237 Id. Moreover, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention demonstrates a 
preference for individual countries to work within their own legal systems and 
encourages coordination through peer review programs.  See Meadows, supra note 
147, at 98 (discussing the OECD’s use of the “principle of functional equivalence” 
to ensure compliance). 
238 The United States and United Kingdom already coordinate their 
enforcement efforts.  In one case, the SFO obtained a civil recovery order rather 
than criminal prosecution because it concluded that double jeopardy prevented 
criminal prosecution in the United Kingdom as                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
the company had already entered into a DPA with the DOJ.  In another case, the 
SEC settled charges that BAE bribed Tanzanian officials in an agreement requiring 
the company to pay fines and plead guilty to criminal charges for making false 
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Convention encourages ratifying states to exchange information 
and coordinate enforcement.239  Agencies enforcing the FCPA have 
also expressed a desire to work with more countries locally to 
improve effectiveness.240  Additionally, as discussed throughout 
this Comment, revised domestic legislation would also harmonize 
India with international anticorruption commitments found in the 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention241 and the U.N. Anticorruption 
Convention.242 
 
statements in regulatory filings and undertakings in both the United States and 
the United Kingdom.  See Covington Mid-Year Review, supra note 153, at 3. 
239 See OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 11, art. 9(1) (obligating 
state parties “to the fullest extent possible under its laws and relevant treaties and 
arrangements, [to] provide prompt and effective legal assistance to another 
Party”).  Countries can also agree to formal coordination of anticorruption efforts 
with OECD countries.  Additionally, the United States employs less formal 
agreements while seeking cooperation in FCPA enforcement with non-OECD 
Convention ratifying countries.  See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding 
Between the U.S. SEC and the Securities and Exchange Board of India Regarding 
Cooperation, Consultation and the Provision of Technical Assistance, Exchange 
Act Release No. IS-1124, 66 SEC Docket 1863, para. 4, Mar. 6, 1998, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/india.pdf (establishing the 
authorities’ intent to cooperate and consult one another on enforcing securities 
laws related to the offer, sale, and purchase of securities and securities fraud).  
The SEC also has MOUs to obtain evidence from overseas with regulators in 
Germany, Portugal, Singapore, and Japan.  See Michael D. Mann & William P. 
Barry, Developments in the Internationalization of Securities Enforcement, 39 INT’L 
LAW. 667, 674–80 (2005) (discussing the SEC’s use of MOUs to establish 
cooperative relationships in securities enforcement with other countries). 
240 U.S. Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer explained: “We need 
strong partners across the globe who are equally committed to that fight and who 
have the capacity to carry through on that commitment.”  Breuer speech, supra 
note 7 (expressing the U.S. Assistant Attorney General’s eagerness to cooperate 
with other countries).  The United States and India signed an MOU agreement in 
1998 to “provide each other assistance in obtaining information and evidence to 
facilitate the enforcement of their respective laws relating to securities matters.”  
See SEC. & EXCH. BD. OF INDIA (SEBI), ANNUAL REPORT 1998 (1998), available at 
http://www.sebi.gov.in/ annualreport/9798/ar97983l.html (noting the first such 
agreement signed between SEBI and another securities regulator). 
241 Although India is not a member of the OECD, the OECD adopted a 2007 
resolution to strengthen its cooperation with India.  See OECD Council Resolution 
on Enlargement and Enhanced Engagement, OECD (May 16, 2007), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/brazil/oecdcouncilresolutiononenlargementandenhanced
engagement.htm (detailing OECD efforts to strengthen cooperation with India 
and other countries through enhanced engagement programs aimed at possible 
membership).  Since December 2009, India has participated in the OECD’s 
Working Group on Bribery meetings as an ad hoc observer and committed to 
more active engagement with the working group in the G20 Anti-Corruption 
Action Plan.  See generally OECD WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY, 2011 ANNUAL REP. 
2011 27 (2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/AntiBriberyAnnRep2011.pdf; G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan, G20 CIVIL, 
http://www.g20civil.com/ documents/G20-Anti-corruption-annex3.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2013).  Various advocates support India joining the OECD.  See, 
e.g. Jha, supra note 63, at 30 (asserting, “It’s time for India” to join the OECD 
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6.  INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF INDIAN ANTICORRUPTION 
ENFORCEMENT 
It is unclear whether the Lokpal Bill will pass in India.  As a 
result, it is difficult to project what body might be responsible for 
enforcing the substantive law recommendations provided in this 
Comment.  If a Lokpal is not established, and the CVC and CBI do 
not more rigorously enforce anticorruption efforts, it is likely that 
the Supreme Court of India will begin to engage in its own 
anticorruption efforts more proactively.  In the past, the Supreme 
Court has at times restrained its direct involvement in 
anticorruption efforts.243  Nonetheless, the Court’s decisions in 
recent years indicate that it may begin to take a more active stance 
in Indian anticorruption efforts.  In December 2010, the Chief 
Justice issued an order to the Indian High Courts and district 
courts ordering them to “fast track” all PCA cases.244  One month 
after Parliament failed to pass the Lokpal Bill, the Supreme Court 
considered a case in the “2G Scam” and lamented that the PCA 
lacks a deadline by which the government must deny or grant 
sanction for a corruption investigation.  The Supreme Court 
asserted that this deficiency often resulted in the protection of the 
guilty and “virtually armed the sanctioning authority with 
unbridled power.”245  Additionally, the Supreme Court 
recommended that Parliament adopt a law setting a time limit by 
 
Convention Against Corruption).  According to the OECD legal director, the 
organization has set up a program to encourage membership among emerging 
economies.  See Rebecca Lowe, OECD Legal Director Discusses Financial Crisis and 
Corruption, INT’L BAR ASS’N (Oct. 13, 2011), 
http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx? ArticleUid=1CEC5AED-0218-4FA1-
BAE4-A4E6FE731365 (describing the Enhanced Engagement Programme). 
242 India signed the U.N. Convention in 2005 and ratified the treaty in May 
2011.  See India Ratifies U.N. Convention Against Corruption, TIMES OF INDIA, May 13, 
2011, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-05-13/india/29539746 _1_ 
convention-fight-corruption-assets (announcing India’s ratification of the 
Convention). 
243 For example, in response to a complaint alleging that CBI was shielding 
high-level politicians from its investigations of corruption allegations in the 2010 
Commonwealth Games, the Court refused a request to monitor the CBI inquiry.  
See SC Refuses to Monitor CBI Probe into CWG Scam, FIRSTPOST, Sept. 16, 2011, 
http://www.firstpost.com/fwire/sc-refuses-to-monitor-cbi-probe-into-cwg-
scam-85905.html (reporting that the Indian Supreme Court would not interfere 
with the ongoing problem). 
244 See A.I.S. Cheema, Secretary General, S. Ct. of India, Dec. 13, 2010 (India), 
available at http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/circular/guidelines/cjinote1312 
2010.pdf (ordering high prioritization of all PCA cases). 
245 See Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh, (2012), S. Ct., Civ. App. 
No. 1193 (2012) (India). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss4/11
SOLOMON_REVISED (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2014  1:23 PM 
2013] CORRUPTION IN INDIA 955 
which the Indian government must deny or sanction investigation 
and prosecution under the PCA.246  The Court also imposed a 
deadline for the government to respond to CBI’s investigation 
requests, after which, silence now constitutes the government’s 
sanction of the request.247  The Court’s 2012 decision in the “2G 
Scam” may be an indication of its willingness to pursue judicial 
involvement in anticorruption efforts where the executive and 
legislature fail to take action. 
The Indian judiciary may also seek external pressures to take a 
central seat in combating corruption.  Given the popular backlash 
against corruption, civil society organizations and activists will 
likely seek enforcement of anticorruption statutes through the 
courts using public interest litigation (PIL).  PIL in India provides 
plaintiffs with more liberal rules of standing and procedure and 
permits courts to impose a wider range of remedies than 
traditional litigation.248  The Indian Constitution provides a 
number of bases for PIL in the corruption context.249  For example, 
Article 32 of the Constitution provides individuals with the right of 
direct appeal to the Supreme Court for enforcement of certain 
fundamental rights250 and grants the Court the power to issue a 
number of remedies for the enforcement of these rights.251  The 
Constitution also includes policies that are intended to direct 
 
246 See id. (recommending a government response to corruption complaints 
within four months and asking Parliament to pass legislation to this effect). 
247 See id. Although it is unclear to what degree this deadline is binding, or 
merely recommended.  
248 See Jamie Cassels, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India: 
Attempting the Impossible?, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 495, 498, 506 (1989) (providing two 
examples of a remedial strategy, including one case in which a court allowed a 
chemical plant to reopen after a gas leak only if the plant followed certain safety 
conditions and agreed to inspections). 
249 See, e.g., INDIA CONST. arts. 14–25, 32 (bestowing fundamental rights such 
as the right to equality, the right to equal employment opportunities, and the right 
to religious freedom).  Article 39 provides “that the ownership and control of the 
material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the 
common good” and “that the operation of the economic system does not result in 
the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment.”  
Id. at art. 39 (b), (c). 
250 Part III of the Indian Constitution defines these fundamental rights.  See 
INDIA CONST., arts. 12–35.  
251 See id. at art. 32(1) (providing remedies for the enforcement of 
fundamental rights); id. at art. 32(2) (describing the Supreme Court’s power to 
issue certain remedies).  The Supreme Court’s powers on such issues include 
“directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, 
mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate. . 
. .”  Id. at art. 32(2).  See also id. at art. 226 (granting power to the Indian state High 
Courts to issue certain writs, notwithstanding provisions of Article 32). 
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actions of the Indian state, including directives to reduce inequality 
and distribute societal resources to benefit the common good.252   
India’s unique tradition of PIL, as fostered by these 
constitutional provisions, has traditionally been limited to matters 
of “[s]tate repression, governmental lawlessness, administrative 
deviance, and exploitation of disadvantaged groups and denial to 
them of their rights and entitlements.”253  Nonetheless, despite 
some criticism, the judiciary has indicated that it is willing to use 
PIL remedies more broadly where the executive has failed to take 
action although legislative acts and the Constitution have not been 
properly implemented.254  This trend in judicial activism is 
particularly pertinent to the anticorruption context because, in a 
2012 decision, the Supreme Court recognized a “fundamental 
right” to bring corruption challenges.255  Moreover, the Supreme 
Court held that the PCA is a social legislation and that courts 
should liberally construe the statute to advance its objectives.256  
Given the likelihood of judicial intervention even if India fails to 
modify its current anticorruption regime and the wide range of 
remedies available to the Supreme Court in PIL, some of the 
recommendations of this Comment may be useful even if India is 
unsuccessful in amending the PCA. 
 
252 INDIA CONST., arts. 36–51 (constituting Part IV of the Constitution entitled 
“Directive Principles of State Policy”).  The Indian Parliament is required to apply 
the principles in passing laws, and although the principles are not enforceable in 
court, there is some suggestion that the principles may guide decisions in public 
interest litigation.  See, e.g., P.N. Bhagwati, Judicial Activism and Public Interest 
Litigation, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 561, 568 (1985) (discussing the Directive 
Principles of the Indian Constitution as mandating the legislature and executive to 
protect social justice). 
253 Bhagwati, supra note 250, at 569. 
254 A former Indian Solicitor General claimed that in recent years, judicial 
intervention through PIL decision-making has moved away from its roots of 
“enforcing the rights of the disadvantaged or poor sections of the society but 
simply for correcting the actions or omissions of the executive or public officials 
or departments of government or public bodies.”  T. R. Andhyarujina, Disturbing 
Trends in Judicial Activism, THE HINDU, Aug. 6, 2012, http://www.thehindu. 
com/opinion/lead/article3731471.ece?homepage=true. 
255 See Dr. Subramanian Swamy, supra note 245 (involving a sixteen-month 
delay from an application to prosecute the former telecom minister in the 2G 
scandal). 
256 See State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shri Ram Singh, (2000) 1 S.C.R. 579 (India) 
(describing the PCA as “intended to make effective provision for the prevention 
of bribe [sic] and corruption rampant amongst the public servants”). 
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7.  CONCLUSION 
In 2007, a Wharton Business School article foresaw that, as 
India began to play an increasing global role, India’s multinational 
corporations might “act as a broom, sweeping corruption from the 
economic sphere,” or else corruption “could end up being a 
significant brake on India’s economic rise.”257  Domestic 
anticorruption legislation may be the guide that helps private 
companies contribute to an anticorruption solution in India. 
India’s need for large procurement and licensing contracts, of 
the sort involved in the 2G licensing scandal, are only likely to 
increase in the future as the country continues to grow, its 
economy continues to liberalize, and it seeks to meet the ever-
growing demand for infrastructure, such as roads and electricity.258  
In this context, there is strong need for anticorruption measures 
targeting corrupt practices by bidding companies.  These 
developments also enhance India’s need to maintain a business 
environment that can attract capable businesses to engage in 
effective competition. 
Reformed domestic legislation will make India attractive to 
both domestic and foreign investors because it will increase 
stability of the business environment.  Moreover, reformed 
domestic legislation that targets supply will signal to companies 
that are subject to Bribery Act and FCPA regulations, and that 
often invest in expensive compliance programs to avoid litigation 
and liability, that Indian companies are operating in a similar 
environment so that foreign companies will not have impaired 
profitability. 
A combination of stringent enforcement of the FCPA’s bribery 
offense and accounting requirements and the United States’ 
embrace of alternative enforcement procedures have contributed to 
the successes of the U.S. global anticorruption efforts.  Thus far, the 
Bribery Act appears to be following suit by emphasizing supply-
oriented anti-bribery offenses committed by corporate entities and 
by embracing settlement agreements.  India may benefit from 
taking note of these countries’ efforts by balancing strong 
 
257 In India, Will Corruption Slow Growth or Will Growth Slow Corruption?, 
KNOWLEDGE @ WHARTON, Aug. 8, 2007, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/ 
india/article.cfm?articleid=4214. 
258 See James Fontanella-Khan, India: Suspended Animation, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 18, 
2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5e880566-6d08-11e1-a7c7-00144feab49a. 
html#axzz1phlYYRpO (discussing the obvious need for more infrastructure 
across India). 
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anticorruption efforts with creating a stable and transparent 
environment for both foreign and domestic investments.  
Moreover, India can attempt to equalize the playing field for 
foreign and domestic companies by subjecting all competing 
companies to similar anticorruption penalties. 
In adopting legislation that appropriately targets supply, India 
will want to balance its anticorruption efforts with ensuring that its 
legislation poses only reasonable burdens on businesses and 
individuals.259  A statute that takes appropriate and balanced steps 
in anticorruption efforts will also prevent a gap from developing 
between the letter and enforcement of the law.  For example, 
although the Bribery Act poses stricter de facto law than the FCPA, 
its provisions create a risk of under-enforcement.  As an article 
from The Economist points out, “a commitment to stop paying in 
the future while turning a blind eye today may not only be self-
defeating but risks also undermining the law.”260   
The final deterrence effect of any Indian anticorruption statute 
will depend on the country’s ability and focused efforts to enforce 
the statute, in addition to any symbolic value that passing a 
supply-oriented anticorruption statute may have in encouraging 
compliance with the law.261  India may also take efforts to 
encourage private parties’ self-regulation by providing adequate 
information on appropriate private anticorruption measures and 
 
259 There are risks associated with an over-broad anticorruption statute.  For 
example, when India completely banned political donations during the 1980s, 
there was a substantial rise in political corruption in raising needed election 
funds.  See generally Patel, supra note 42, at 398. 
260 When a Bribe Is Merely Facilitating Business, supra note 32 (suggesting that 
anything less than a zero-tolerance policy for bribery would undermine 
enforcement of the Bribery Act). 
261 For example, Joseph Stiglitz recently described that certain economic 
reforms can have a certain symbolic value.  See Interview with Joseph Stiglitz, 
ECON. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2012, 3:26 PM), http://m.economictimes.com/opinion/ 
interviews/ratings-agencies-unfair-to-india-give-little-weight-to-them-joseph-
stiglitz-columbia-university/articleshow/16850116.cms (“One should not 
overemphasize the importance of . . . reforms.  They have a certain symbolic value 
to them.”).  For more discussion of the expressive function of law, see generally 
Amir N. Licht, Social Norms and the Law: Why Peoples Obey the Law, 4 REV. L. & 
ECON. 715 (2008); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2021 (1996); Yuval Feldman, The Expressive Function of the Law: Legality, Cost, 
Intrinsic Motivation and Consensus (Bar Ilan Univ. Pub. Law Working Paper No. 1–
04, 2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=912989.  Nonetheless, the 
symbolic value of laws depends on country and environment-specific 
circumstances and it is unclear what, if any, symbolic value a revised 
anticorruption law would have in India.  
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by facilitating private initiatives to encourage compliance, such as 
the aforementioned integrity pacts in procurement contracts. 
These concerns represent some of the various questions that 
will follow India’s passage of amended anticorruption legislation.  
Although India will have to address a number of procedural, 
institutional, and substantive questions in implementing a 
modified anticorruption regime, the country would greatly benefit 
from establishing clear offenses for bribing public officials and 
developing flexible means of enforcement if it is to be successful in 
combatting large-scale corruption. 
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